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NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE BOARDS AND DELEGATION OF POWER.-With the
growth of American federalism and the passing of the doctrines of
laissez faire as axioms of economic and political legal theory, the Congressional function magnified. Throughout the last decade the multiphased problems of Congress has necessitated the creation of administrative commissions to perform-the policies of the legislature. Congress continues to declare the law and determine the legal principle to control
in given cases. In the same breath of legal creation it goes farther and
provides for an administrator or commission to vitiate the doctrine set-

NOTES
out. The transfusion of power from the national legislature to the administrator promotes sensitive Constitutional objection. Close followers
of the separation-of-powers doctrine forget that Montesquieu lived
in an era much less affected by a complex federalism than our present conditions present. Despite the conflict arising over the delegation
of legislative power, overwhelming authority will admit the delegation
of a ministerial function to an administrative group. This harmony
discords, however, when the question of statutory standards arises.
How much discretion may the established board enjoy? To what extent must they be kept on the puppet-strings of Congress? Recent decisions continue to reflect contrary opinion. From the conflict we may
make some conclusions.
The very nature of a delegation demands that the agency of Congress will employ some amount of discretion. As early as 1825 Chief
Justice Marshall stated that when Congress had decided the general'
principle of the measure, the administrative body might Constitutionally "fill in the details." This principle roots deeply in American Constitutional law.1 The Supreme Court has consistently intimated that
Congress must demarcate as completely as is practicable the limits of
the general rule it has laid down. Yet Congress has authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury "to establish standards" for the admission
of tea to this country; 2 it has delegated to the Inter-State Commerce
Commission the power "to designate rates and set the maximum variation and standard drawbars for freight cars"; 3 it has authorized the
same commission to require railroads to keep accounts in a manner
specified - not by the national legislature, but by the commission itself.4 Congress has even delegated the power "to make regulations" pertaining to the sale of oleomargarine. 5 In the creation of the Federal
Trade Commission, the Security Exchange Commision, the Federal
Communications Commission and a bevy of other bureaus Congress
delegated rate-making and regulatory power in terms of sweeping generality as the few instances above show. It must be remembered that a
subject of this type requires legislation for the regulation of future conduct. The objects of the delegation are obviously set-out in a declaration of policy but the particular grants of power are so diffuse and
1 Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. (23 U. S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 253 (1825); United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 31 S. Ct. 480, 55 L. Ed. 563 (1911); Hannibal
Bridge Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 194, 31 S. Ct. 603, 55 L. Ed. 699 (1911);
Inter-State Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194, 32
S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (1912); J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U. S. 394, 48 S. Ct. 348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1928).
2 Butterfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 S. Ct. 349, 48 L. Ed. 525 (1904).
8 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 28 S. Ct. 616,
52 L. Ed. 1061 (1908).
4

Inter-State Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S.

194, 32 S. Ct. 436, 56 L. Ed. 729 (1912).
5 In Re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 S. Ct. 444,41 L. Ed. 813 (1897).
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variable that they can not be distinctly apprehended and comprised in
the ordinary terms of legislative classification. If Congress were to
classify a complete nomenclature of cases and events in which the
board should function, describe a course of action for each possible future event, the very purpose of the delegation would-be defeated before
the enactment was drawn.
In the decision of the now famous Schechter Poultry case,6 Chief
Justice Hughes stated: "Section thrde of the recovery act is without
precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity.
It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct, it authorizes the
making of codes to prescribe them." Later in the opinion he continues
to say: "For that legislative undertaking section three sets up no
standards, aside from the general aims of rehabilitation, correction and
expansion." The 1935 high tribunal obviously took little notice of the
earlier chain of cases which held: "Standards may be laid down in
broad and general terms. If the legislature were required to specify
minutely and in detail the course to be pursued by the administrative
agency, there would be no advantage gained by the delegation"; 7 nor tothe previous holding that: "A discretion - broad or narrow as the
legislature shall deem expedient - may be vested in the delegate." S
In the early years of the Inter-State Commerce Commission the
delegation of the rate making power was often challenged on grounds
that it provided no standards. In 1913 Mr. Justice Hughes stated: "The
rate-making power necessarily implies a range of legislative discretion,
and so long as the legislative action is within the proper sphere, -the
Courts are not entitled to interpose and, upon their own investigation
of traffic problems and conditions,.to substitute their judgment for that
of the legislature or of the railroad commission exercising its delegated
powers." Subsequent tests of the constitutionality of the transportationgoverning commission have failed to disturb this expression of the
earlier court. The Federal Trade Commission has likewise been exposed
to this attack on standards and the discretion of the boards. Judge
Baker stated the accepted rule to this-group of cases when he ruled:
"The commissioners, representing the government as parens patriae,
are to exercise their common sense as informed by their knowledge of
the general idea of unfair trade at common law." 9 In this instance the
statute did not define the meaning of "unfair trade." Such neglect did
not, however, defeat its legality.
6 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. Ed.
1570, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935).
7 Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 35
S. Ct. 387 (1915).
8 Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina, 222 U. S.
380, 32 S. Ct. 1'52 (1911).
9 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.-Fed. Trade Comm., 258 F. 307 (1919).

NOTES
The latest challenge of a legislative delegation of power on grounds
of "unfettered discretion" and failure of Congress to provide standards
is found in Roach v. Johnson.10 Federal District Judge Slick ruled *the
Emergency Price Control Act 11 unconstitutional on this ground. The
decision states: "Congress, under its War Powers, has authority to
regulate prices limited only by the Constitutional inhibition to provide
standards." Further along it states: "Again in the case at bar, as was
held in the Panama case,' 2 if it could be inferred that Congress intended
certain circumstances or conditions to govern the exercise of the authority conferred, the Administrator could not act validly without complying with the circumstances and conditions and findings by the Administrator that these conditions existed and were necessary, else it is left
entirely to the unfettered discretion of the Administrator." A close inspection of the Emergency Price Control Act leads one to believe that
this holding is not entirely founded. Section 902 of the statute states:
"So far as practicable, in establishing any maximum price, the Administrator shall ascertain and give due consideration to prices prevailing
between October 1st and October 15th, 1941 . . . and shall make ad-

justments for each relevant factor as he may determine." Admittedly
the statute permits the Administrator discretionary power to investigate
previous rentals and commodity prices, to peg both at the date specified
and to adjust equitably if the prices of October, 1941 are not generally
representative. How else could Congress provide for price fixing? No
two districts in the country have identical food, clothing and rental
values. By delegating a latitude of operation to the Administrator, the
purpose of the act - to prevent inflation by price stabilization, is affected intelligently. We have already seen that general terms stating
standards may provide for the power transfusion. Yet this case would
confine Congress to specific delegations within stated standards and defeat the expeditious purpose of this War necessity. It is interesting to
note that Judge Slick did not cite one of the many authoritative cases
providing that Congress "shall do no more than lay down the general
rules of action under which the Commission shall proceed," 13 nor was
the often cited Sears, Roebuck case 14 mentioned - a leading authority
for the contrary view which defends the constitutionality of the Federal
Trade Commission because Congress declared "the public policy applicable to the situation."
From the majority of cases we would surmise that Congress may
delegate legislative power - legislative in the sense of providing rates,
Roach v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 833 (1943).
11 U. S. C. A. Title 50, App. § 901.
10

Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
Roach v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 833 (1943).
14 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm., 258 F. 307, 169 C. C. A.
323, 6 A. L. R. 358 (1919).
12
13
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rules and regulations for future conduct - to administrative bodies. In
the majority of cases general standards suffice as we have seen from
the creation of the Inter-State Commerce, Federal Trade and Federal
Communications Commissions. In other instances, the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Emergency Price Control Act being
typical, more specific statements by the legislature is necessary
'though questionably so. What the future of Administrative law will
be we can not predict. Perhaps our present Supreme Court will give
us a clue in the very near future when the rent-control case 15 stands
review.
William B. Lawless, Jr.

CONSTRUCTIvE TRUSTS ARISING OUT OF PURCHASES AT JUDICIAL

SALs.-While the English Statute of Frauds of 1676 required a writing
to create an express trust in real property, such statute has had no application in cases where the law raises a constructive trust by reason
of the fraudulent acts and purposes in procuring title to the land.' Constructive trusts have been held not to be within the statute of frauds
because they rest in the end on the doctrine of estoppel and the operation of an estoppel is never effected by the statute of frauds. 2
A common situation whereby such a (constructive) trust might
come into being, would be where A who had mortgaged land to C was
about to lose it through foreclosure proceedings. B, a relative of A,
came to A and represented to A that he would buy it at the sheriff's
sale and hold it for A's benefit,, offering also to give A a writing to this
effect and containing also permission for A to redeem it, but he baffled
A in relation to this writing and never gave it to him. By these circumstances A was prevented from raising money to purchase in the
land until it was too late for him to succeed in so doing, and B purchased at the sheriff's sale. It is generally held that B must be taken
to have purchased in trust for A. 3 For one purchasing land at a judicial
sale under an oral agreement to purchase for the benefit of another will
be decreed to hold the land for the benefit of the promisee where there
existed between them a confidential relation aside from that created by
the agreement to purchase, 4 or where the promisee supplied a part of
15

Roach v. Johnson, 48 F. Supp. 833 (1943).

1 Johnson v. Hayward, 74 Neb. 157; 103 N. W. 1058 (1905).
2 Parker v. Catron, 120 Ky. 145; 85 S: W. 740 (1905).
3 Dickson v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 424; 98 N. W. 1085; 111 Am. St. Rep. 596

(1904).
4 Strasner v. Carroll, 125 Ark. 34; 187 S. W. 1057; Ann. Cas. 1918E 306
(1916); Carter v. Gibson, 29 Neb. 324; 45 N. W. 634 (1890); Cutler v. Babcock,

81 Wis. 195; 51 N. W. 420 (1892).

NOTES
the purchase money, 5 or was lulled into inactivity through which the
promisee was prevented from protecting his rights in the land, 6 or refrained from doing so whereby the promisor was enabled by his agreement to secure the land at a price materially below the actual value, 7
or where persons interested in the land under the oral agreement remained in possession thereof and made valuable improvements. Where
such promisor had been guilty of fraudulent conduct in bringing about
such sale by fraud or other wrong a constructive trust arises in favor
of the true owner. Under circumstances or state of facts that would
make it inequitable to permit him to hold on to his bargain, as by representing that he is buying for the benefit of those who own or have an
interest in the property being sold or that he intends to reconvey such
property to him or to permit them to redeem it and thereby discourages other bidding or obtains the property at a sacrifice, such purchaser
will be deemed in equity a constructive trustee for the persons injured
by the fraud.8
A noteworthy case that has often been cited by the courts is Prescott v. Jenness,9 where a mortgagor who had been promised the right
to redeem, though his rights had been foreclosed, orally agreed with
another that the latter should purchase the title of the mortgagee and
execute a written agreement to permit redemption within a specified
time. The refusal of the party after purchasing the property to carry
out the agreement constituted a fraud and he was held to be a constructive trustee for the mortgagor. In a similar case, Cutler v. Babcock,10 the purchaser was not allowed to adopt and use the agreement
by which he obtained title and repudiate its condition by which he was
to convey it, in execution of the contract to the other party.
Where prospective bidders at a judicial sale, believing that the
promisor in the oral agreement was buying for the promisee whose land
was being sold to satisfy debts against him, refrained from bidding, the
court in Carter v. Gibson 1 imposed a constructive trust upon the purchaser and ordered a reconveyance to the debtor. Cutler v. Babcock,
held likewise, where the promisee in the oral agreement refained from
bidding on account of the oral agreement. Also where the promisee relaxed his efforts to save the property from being sold at the judicial
5
6

Patrick v. Kirkland, 53 Fla. 768; 40 So. 969; 12 Ann. Cas. 540 .(1907).
Hunt v. Elliott, 80 Ind. 245; 41 Am. Rep. 794 (1881).
7 Strasner v. Carroll, 125 Ark. 34; 187 S. W. 1057; Ann. Cas. 1918E 306
(1916); Patrick v. Kirkland, 53 Fla. 768; 40 So. 964; 12 Ann. Cas. 540 (1907).
8 Dickson v. Stewart, 71 Neb. 424; 98 N. W. 1085; 111 Am. St. Rep. 596

(1904).
O 77 N. H. 84; 88 A. 218 (1893).
10 81 Wis. 195; 51 N. W. 420 (1892).
11 29 Neb. 324; 45 N. W. 634 (1890); Combs v. Little, 4 N. J. Eq. 310; 40
Am. Dec. 207 (1843); Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y. 307; 90 Am. Dec. 289 (1866);
Denton v. McKenzie, 1 Desaus (S. C.) 289 (1792).
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sale. Strasner v. Cdrroll12 and Hunt v. Elliott 1 held that a constructive trust should be impressed upon the purchaser. The Florida court
in Patrick v. Kirkland'14 similarly construed a constructive trust where
the promisee relaxed his efforts to prevent a sale at a sacrifice. Dickson
v. Stewart 15 similarly held a constructive trust where the promisor
in the oral agreement bought in the property at a price greatly below
its value.
It has been said that if one having any interest in land is induced
to confide in the verbal promise of another, that he will purchase it for
the benefit of the former at a sheriff's sale and in pursuance of this allows him to become the holder of the legal title, a subsequent denial by.
the latter of the confidence is such a fraud as will convert the purchaser into a trustee ex maleficio.16
7
A Missouri case, Merrett v. Poulter,1
held that a man who purchased land at a tax sale induced other bidders to refrain from bidding
saying that he would buy the land for the owner, who was his neighbor,
would be charged as a trustee for the latter or the sale would be set
aside.
A constructive trust is predicated upon betrayal of confidence or the
violation of duties arising out of a fiduciary relation. A fiduciary relation may be established in numerous ways.' 8 It is a mere incident that
it happens in a particular case to arise out of a verbal agreement. Equity
will not tolerate a betrayal of confidence and it makes no difference how
this confidence was obtained. The court in Miller v. Henderson 10 stated
that a fiduciary relation does not depend on technical relations created
by or defined in law but exist in cases where special confidence has been
reposed in one who, in equity, is bound to act in good faith and with
due regard to the interests of one reposing the confidence.
A trust is declared due to confidential relation existing between the
parties. The terms, "fiduciary relation" and "confidential relation" are
comprehensive ones, such relationships existing whenever influence has
been acquired and abused or confidence has been reposed and betrayed. Noble v. Noble 20 held that a confidential relation existed where
a brother held land in trust for a mentally incompetent sister, and
Koelford v. Thompson 21 said that a confidential relation existed where
12

13
14
15
16

17
18

19
20
21

125 Ark. 34; 187 S. W. 1057; Ann. Cas. 1918E 306 (1916).
80 Ind. 245; 41 Am. Rep. 794 (1881).
53 Fla. 768; 40 So. 969; 12 Ann. Cas. 540 (1907).
71 Neb. 424; 98 N. W. 1085; 111 Am. St. Rep. 596 (1904).
Gruhn v. Richardson, 128 11. 178; 21 N. E. 18 (1889).
96 Mo. 237, 9 S. W. 586 (1888).
42 A. L. R. 78-115.
33 Pac. (2nd) 1098 (1934).
225 Ill. 629; 99 N. E. 631 (1912).
73 Neb. 128; 102 N. W. 268 (1905).
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the legal title was given to the grantee by a quasi-partner to be pledged
and money obtained to pay the grantor's debts. Such a relation was
held confidential in Pope v. Dufray 22 where the relation the promisor
and promisee sustained to each other Was parent and child; likewise,
where the relation was mother-in-law and son-in-law, 23 a similar holding is found.
A contract whereby one person employs an agent to negotiate for
the sale of real estate is not a contract for the creation of an estate or
interest in land, or trust, or power over or concerning land within the
statute of frauds, as was held in Johnson v. Hayward.24 And where
the agent, employed to purchase the real estate becomes the purchaser for himself, he will be considered in equity as holding the property in trust for his principal, although he purchased with his own
money, subject to reimbursement for his proper expenses in that be25
half.
The fact that the owner in reliance on the agreement has refrained
from bidding or has relaxed his exertion to raise money to prevent the
sale, is such a circumstance at least where the property was bid in at
less than its value. In such a case there may be said to have been such
a change of position by the owner in reliance on the agreement as to
estop the bidder from setting up the statute of frauds.
It is not the parol contract but the trust that is sought to be enforced.
If the owners were lulled into insecurity and thereby induced to desist from trying to save their property and the person agreeing to buy
it acquires it at a grossly inadequate price, then the right of action rests
not upon the parol contract but upon the fiduciary relations and transactions of which the agreement was a mere attendant. In McNinch v.
American Trust Co. 26 the court stated that it was not necessary that
actual fraud be shown, but the establishment of such conduct and bad
faith on the part of the defendants as would shock the conscience of
the chancellor would suffice to invoke the aid of a court of equity. The
promisee acting on the faith of the agreement with the promisor may
have ceased his efforts to raise money for the purpose of paying off the
execution and thus preventing the sale of his property. In fact it could
only be for the purpose of saving his property that such an oral agreement would be made, and it is but reasonable and natural to suppose
that further efforts would be made, did not the particular promisor afford sufficient assurance that he would make the desired purchase and
therefore afford the desired protection.
22
23
24

25
26

176 1U. 478; 52 N. E. 58 (1898).
Stubbins v. Briggs, 68 S. W. 392 (1902).
74 Neb. 157; 103 N. W. 1058 (1905).
Rose v. Hayden, 25 Kan. 106; 57 Am. R. 145 10 Pac. 554 (1886).
183 N. C. 331; 110S. E. 663 (1922).
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Some cases 27 hold that where a person who had agreed to buy land
for another bought in his own name and paid for the purchase with his
own money, he will nevertheless be held a trustee for the other, where
it is shown that it was understood he should advance the purchase
money as a loan to the one for whose benefit the land was bought.
Fraud can only be predicated upon existing facts, or facts alleged
to exist, not upon a mere promise to do something afterwards, 28 and the
fraud must be something more than a mere refusal to perform the oral
agreement, such as the2 9use of deception or other'unfair means in procuring the conveyance.
Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and justice where there is no intention of the party to
create such a relation and often directly contrary to the intention of
the one holding the legal title. If one party obtains legal title to the
property not only by fraud or by violation of confidence or fiduciary
relations but in any other unconscientious manner so that he cannot
equitably retain the property which really belongs to another, equity
carries out its theory of double ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a constructive trust upon the property in favor of the one who
is considered in equity as the beneficial owner.3 0 It follows as a result
of this rule that fraud arises at once upon repudiation by the trustee
of any trust, even though it is in parol 3 1 and even though its effect is
82
very nearly to do away with the statute of frauds in this class of cases.
a
deup
as
be
set
cannot
of
frauds
It is seen therefore that the statute
fense as it cannot be used to work a fraud. 83 The New Hampshire
Court added that whatever the intention of the purchaser may have
been at the time of the sale, his subsequent refusal to declare the trust
in writing and to hold the property for the protection of the other
party's interest operates as a palpable fraud, which the statute of frauds
was not intended to validate. When it appears that the understanding
at the time of the verbal promise was by a writing to comply with the
provisions of the statute of frauds, it is something more than a mere
verbal promise or stipulation to reduce it to writing and this makes him
secure. If, in confidence that such a writing will be executed the legal
title is acquired, it is a fraud in the purchaser to refuse to do what vas
hold discharged of it which will constitute
promised and is a claim to
34
him a trustee ex maleficio.
27

Jackson v. Steven, 108 Mass. 94 (1871); McDonough v. O'Neill, 113

Mass. 92 (1873); Kendall v. Mann, 11 Allen 151 (1865).
28 Gregory v. Bowlshy, 115 Ia. 327; 88 N. W. 822 (1902).
29 Goff v. Goff, 98 Kan. 201; 158 Pac. 662 (1916).
30 1 Pomeroy, Equity jurisprudence 155 (1905).
31 Bogert, Trusts 127 (1921); Willats v. Bosworth, 33 Cal. App. 710; 166
Pac. 359 (1917).
32

83
34

Westphal v. Heckman, 185 Ind. 88; 113 N. E. 299 (1916).
Prescott v. Jenness, 77 N. H. 84; 88A 218 (1893).

Wolford v. Herrington, 74 Pac. 311, 315; 15 Am. R. 548 (1873); Jones

National Bank v. Price, 37 Neb. 291; 55 N. W. 1045 (1893).
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It is alleged that such a judicial interpretation does not do violence
to the statute of frauds, since the court is not enforcing the express oral
trust itself, but is raising a constructive trust upon the failure of the
express trust in order to prevent unjust enrichment. The cases rest on the
doctrine that though the statute of frauds prevents the enforcement of
the express oral trust of land, a court of equity will make the grantee a
constructive trustee since "it is not honest for him to keep the land." 35
The theory of the courts is that they are doing no more violence to
the statute of frauds by preventing unjust enrichment through the doctrine of constructive trusts in equity than a court of law does violence
to the statute of frauds in allowing recovery in quasi-contract where the
statute of frauds requires a writing in the transfer of lands. While there
must be fraud to raise a constructive trust, the courts will make a special effort to give full weight to any evidence of fraud in order to work
out justice in a case which otherwise would result in unjust enrichment.3 6
Some courts have held that while usually the burden of showing that
a conveyance was obtained by fraud is on the party attacking the conveyance, nevertheless the burden of proof shifts where there is a family
relationship of confidence between the grantor and no consideration was
paid for the property. 37
It would seem then that the same courts might hold that the burden
should be upon the grantee of a gratuitous conveyance to show that it
was free from fraud where (1) there was proof of importunity by the
grantee in securing the conveyance from the grantor, (2) where there
was an intimate family relationship involving confidence such as husband and wife, (3) where there were suspicious circumstances which
would seem to show that an absolute conveyance in accordance with
38
the face was not intended.
It has been noted that the owner of the land who has permitted his
interest to be extinguished by a judicial sale, relying upon the oral
agreement of the purchaser, is entitled to be put in statu quo if the purchaser refuses to carry out his promise. The principle underlying the
imposition of a constructive trust in such a case is that the defendant
would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff if he were
permitted to keep the property and in order to prevent this unjust enrichment a court of equity will restore the statu quo by compelling the
defendant to reconvey the property to the plaintiff on being reimbursed
by the plaintiff for the amount expended by him in making the purchase.
Timothy M. Green.
35
36
37
38

Davies v. Otty, 35 Beavan 208, 55 Eng. Rep. 875 (1865).
Bogert, Trusts § 129.
2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 962; 1 Bigelow, Law of Fraud 537.
36 Harvard Law Review 105; 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 2503.
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EVIDENCE -

IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION.-The

Supreme Court

of the United States on January 11, 1943 handed down a decision interpreting the "immunity" clause which is contained in Sherman AntiTrust Act, Interstate Commerce Act, and other Acts passed wherein
said clause is identical, and settled, for the time being at least, the question of the obligation of a witness to claim his constitutional privilege
before he is entitled to immunity from future criminal prosecution,
where he gives self-incriminating evidence before a grand jury under
a subpoena. This question has, since the amendment to the Sherman
Act, plagued the Federal Courts with indecision and uncertainty. The
arguments pro and con are multitudinous, as each District Judge seemed
to decide the question on his own logic and attitude toward the immunity clause. Uniformity on the issue was unknown.
Finally late last year the question was placed directly before the
Supreme Court. Was or was not a witness, subpoenaed before a grand
jury, entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution upon giving selfincriminating testimony? In said case, U. S. v. Monia,1 the court said:
"A natural person who in obedience to subpoena gives testimony under
oath, or produces evidence under oath, before a grand jury inquiring
into an alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act substantially
touching the alleged offense obtains immunity from prosecution for the
offense although he does not claim his privilege against self-incrimination." The Sherman Act 2 in part provides: "No person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for an account of
any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or
produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit,
or prosecution under said Acts; Provided further, That no person so
testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury
committed in so testifying." As supplemented - it reads materially:
"Under the immunity provisions immunity shall extend only to a natural person who, in obedience to a subpoena, gives testimony under
oath or produces evidence, documentary or otherwise, under oath."
After running briefly through the history of the Act and presenting
the decisions and other factors that have caused the Act to read as it
now does, Mr. Justice Roberts, writer of the majority opinion, based
his view upon the language of the clause and its apparent meaning te
the layman. To quote the learned judge: "The legislation involved in
the instant cases is plain in its terms -and, on its face, means to the
layman that if he is subpoeaned, and sworn, and testifies, he is to have
immunity.. .. Congress evidently intended to afford Government officials the choice of subpoenaing a witness and putting him under oath,
with the knowledge that he would have complete immunity from pros2

63 S. Ct. 409 (1943).
32 Stat. 904, 15 U. S. C. A. 32.

3

34 Stat. 798, 15 U. S. C. A. 33.

1

NOTES
ecution respecting any matter substantially connected with the transactions in respect of which he testified, or retaining the right to prosecute by foregoing the opportunity to examine him. That Congress did
not intend, or by the statute in issue provide, that, in addition, the
witness must claim his privilege, seems clear. It is not for us to add to
the legislation what Congress pretermitted." To which view of the
court Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented and was joined in his dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas.
It is the dissent, rather than the majority view upon which we wish
to comment for it seems the more logical and better substantiated of
the two opinions. Justice Frankfurter as the foundation of his dissent
attacks the'problem from a different viewpoint. At the axis of the problem, he sees a duty not a privilege. The privilege is the offspring, a qualification of the duty, and the immunity a substitute for the privilege,
which has been crystallized into our fundamental law. To quote:
"Duty, not privilege, lies at the core of the problem - the duty to
testify, and not a privilege that relieves of such duty." In the classic
phrase of Lord Chancellor Hardurche, "the public has a right to every
man's evidence." The duty to give testimony was qualified at common
law by the privilege against self-incrimination. And the Fifth Amendment has embodied this privilege in our fundamental law. But the
privilege is a privilege to withhold answers and not a privilege to
limit the range of public inquiry. The Constitution does not forbid the
asking of criminative questions. It provides only that a witness cannot
be compelled to answer such questions unless a "full substitute" for
the constitutional privilege is given. But the Constitution does not protect a refusal to obey a process. There never has been a privilege to
disregard the duty to which a subpoena" calls. And when Congress
turned to the device of immunity legislation, therefore, it did not provide a "substitute" for the performance of the universal duty to appear as a witness - it did not undertake to give something for nothing.
It was the refusal to give incriminating testimony for which Congress
bargained, and not the refusal to give any testimony. And it was only
in -exchange for self-incriminating testimony which "otherwise could
not be got" because of the witness's invocation of his constitutional
right that Congress conferred immunity against the use of such testimony. The learned Justice then follows up his logic by denying that
the immunity provision was an act of general amnesty, but a quid per
quo for the constitutional privilege, and that as a witness to avail himself of his constitutional privilege must claim such a privilege, he must
also claim the substitute of that privilege, namely the immunity. On
the exigencies of the case, it seems more reasonable to put the burden
of claiming the immunity upon the witness, rather than 'force the
officials of government to call upon him to elect to do so, as in most
cases the witness alone knows whether the information requested will
tend to incriminate him. The one subpoenaed as a witness is not the
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person under investigation, and if the District Attorney suspects the
criminal involvement of said witness he Will, of necessity, advance the
immunity in exchange for that person's testimony. But, as in the majority of cases, the District Attorney has not the slightest inkling that the
witness is criminally involved. Therefore, the burden should fall upon
the witness to claim his privilege by refusing to so testify, and then the
immunity will extend to him if the grand jury insists upon said testimony. The argument has been advanced that if the witness must claim
the immunity before becoming entitled to it, the provision will operate
as a trap upon said witness. But such is not the case, as the witness
will no more be entrapped by the requirement that he stand upon his
constitutional rights, if he desires this protection, when there is an immunity statute than where there is none at all. Judge Gubbin U. S. v.
Skinner 4 said: "If any hardship attends the imposition of this burden
on the witness, it has never been considered weighty enough to relieve
him therefrom in exercising his constitutional privilege prior to the
immunity statutes. The immunity granted by the statute is a mere substitute for the constitutional safeguard, and has been held to be conterminous with it. There would seem, therefore, to be no reason for a.
different practise as to the assertion of the privilege where immunity is
desired and where the constitutional privilege is insisted upon."
In the majority opinion the immunity clause was interpretedupon
its face and according to its language only. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
the dissent attempts to go behind the language and points out that
Congress intended that the witness must claim the immunity to beget
5
its benefits. Since the Securities Act of 1933, seventeen regulatory
measures, which contain provisions for immunity from prosecution in
exchange for self-incriminating testimony, have been passed by Congress. Of these, fourteen confer immunity when a person testifies under
compulsion "after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimina6
tion." The remaining three, the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, the In7
do not
1938,8
of
Act
dustrial Alcohol Act, and Fair Labor Standards
customarform
old
the
follow
merely
but
clause,
contain this additional
ily used prior to 1933. It is pointed out that both Motor CarrierAct,
and the Industrial Alcohol Act were enacted as amendments to the
Interstate Commerce, and the National Prohibition Act respectively,
and that these acts naturally incorporated the inforcement provisions
of the old Acts. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is even a more
conclusive argument in his favor, for this Act when first introduced
contained the explicit provision that a person gains immunity "after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination." It remained
218 F. 870 (1914).
5 48 Stat. 87, 15 U. S. C. A. 77v.
4
6
7
8

49 Stat. 550, 49 U. S. C. A. 305.
49 Stat. 875.
52 Stat. 1065, 29 U. S. C. A. 209.
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in this form until a year later when the whole conception of the bill
was changed. Everything was struck out, and a new bill was presented,
in which bill the provision for the attendance of witnesses in the enforcement of the Act, simply incorporated by reference the provision
of the Federal Trade Commision Act. 9 By this history of more modern
Acts, the justice infers the intent of Congress to put the burden upon
the witness to claim his privilege.
Let us now look at the more important decisions upon this question,
of which the majority will necessarily be from the District Courts, the
Supreme Court not having decided the issue previously. The hosts of
opinions were put underway, when in March of 1906 in U. S. v. Armour
and Co.,10 Justice Humphrey ruled that individuals who afforded the
Commissioners an opportunity to examine packers' books and papers
were entitled to immunity under the immunity clause. This presumably
was a startling decision to the makers of the law, for the President 1
immediately advised Congress to pass a declaratory act to set aside
Judge Humphrey's misconception. Congress on June 30, 1906 amended
the Act as above mentioned, correcting the two errors of Judge Humphrey, namely that a corporation was not entitled to the immunity,
and that a person must give evidence under the ordinary formalities incident to being a witness.
For seventeen years thereafter, it was unquestioned that Congress
had given no more than the Constitution required, and that a witness
must claim his privilege to refuse to incriminate himself. Decisions such
as Heike v. U. S. 12 which, while not deciding upon the same set of
facts, or the same issue, did attempt an interpretation of the immunity
clause. Justice Holmes' view of the clause comes to light from the following words: "But the obvious purpose of the statute is to make
evidence available and compulsory that otherwise could not be got.
We see no reason for supposing that the act offered a gratuity for
crime. It should be construed, so far as its words fairly allow the construction, as coterminous with what otherwise would have been the
privilege of the person concerned." Such is Justice Holmes' view, rendered soon after the passage of the amendment, and clearly upholding
the dissenting opinion in the present case under discussion.
3
The following year another decision, U. S. v. Skinner,' deciding exactly the same situation presented here, was banded down by District
Judge Gubb. To quote the decision, he says: "A person to be entitled
to immunity from prosecution, must claim his constitutional privilege
1s U. S.-C. A. 41.
142 F. 808 (1905).
11 Message from the President, April 18, 1906, H. Doc. No. 706, 59th Con'g.,
1st Sess.
12 227 U. S. 121, 33 S. Ct. 226 (1913).
13 218 F. 870 (1914).
9

10
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against self-incrimination while testifying before the Commission, since
it was always competent for a person to voluntarily incriminate himself, and the statute was necessary only to enable the government to
obtain testimony which otherwise would not be given, and the statutes
should not be construed, as going further than the necessity of the case
demanded, thereby conferring a gratuitous amnesty for crime, unnecessary for the purposes of law enforcement, especially as the government is entitled to know whether the testimony is given voluntarily,
for the purpose of exoneration, or with the intention of claiming immunity, in order that it may exercise its option to admit the testimony
and thereby grant the immunity, or reject the testimony and deny the
immunity." These words are forcible, clear, and precise. No comment
need be made, the case is squarely in point and decisively decided.
Then again, the succeeding year Judge Hunt in U. S. v. Elton 14 upheld Judge Gubb's decision. The facts in said case were as follows:
The defendant was subpoenaed, and testified under oath before the
Interstate Commerce Commission as to an attempt to create a monoply
of transportation facilities in violation to the Sherman Act, after being led to believe that immunity would be given, and under threats
that the Commission would proceed criminally against any person
testifying under a subpoena who refused to give his evidence. The
Commission had expressly refused immunity to others not sworn, and
defendant had not conferred with counsel as to a possible waiver of
immunity before testifying. He was subsequently indicted upon grounds
as to which he had testified before the Commission. It was, on that set
of facts, decided that circumstances were such, that in justice the
defendant should be construed to come under the immunity clause.
But in rendering the decision Judge Hunt also warned, citing U. S. v.
Skinner, that, "such immunity is only conferred where the witness
would have been privileged under Constitution U. S. Amendment 5,
and where such evidence is given without assertion of the constitutional
privilege, or is declined to be given on any ground other than because
of its incriminating tendency, immunity is not conferred, the statute
having been passed with regard to the prior construction of the 5th
amendement, under which an assertion of privilege is necessary."
Another decision in favor of the dissent is U. S. v. Lee 15 wherein
District Judge Bledsoe ruled that, "to entitle a person to immunity
from prosecution because of information given the commission, he
must have put the government on notice that the information required
might tend. to incriminate him, and that it was given only in consideration of the immunity afforded by the statute."
Closely following this decision, seventeen years after the passage of
the amendement of the immunity clause, the first decision denying the
14
15

222 F. 428 (1915).
290 F. 517 (1921).
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burden of claiming the immunity appears. This decision was rendered
by District Judge Hutcheson in U. S. v. Pardue,16 wherein he decides
that to be entitled to the immunity it is not necessary that the witness
should claim it before the commission. As authority he cites U. S. v.
Armour 17 already commented upon as being in error, evidenced by
the amendment, U. S. v. Swift,18 a doubtful decision which could al-

most be cited by either side, but seems more logically to point against
2
19
Hutcheson's opinion, People of N. Y. v. Sharp, and State v. Murphy, 0
a Wisconsin case, which has been repudiated by the court which ren22
dered it.21 In discussing the opposing view, he cited U. S. v. Heike,
but overlooked the appeal to the Supreme Court as above mentioned.
Again the next year in U. S. v. Ward,23 the question of immunity
was decided. Some cite this as authority for the proposition that the
necessity of claiming the immunity does not exist, but in the decision
that exact question is not raised, nor even considered. In fact no authorities, or cases are cited concerning any point. The court merely
decided that under the circumstances presented the witness was immune from prosecution.
U. S. v. Moore,24 still another case advancing an opinion supporting
the majority, was decided two years subsequent to the previous mentioned case. This last case was decided primarily upon the construction
given the immunity clause in Brown v. Walker 25 wherein the court
said: "The act securing a witness immunity from prosecution, is virtually an act of general amnesty; that it completely shields a witness
against any, criminal prosecution." This view of the statute was later
rejected in Heike v. U. S., supra. It must also be considered that the
,witness, under the indictment had refused to testify, thereby raising the
claim to his constitutional privilege, and so was entitled to the immunity. U. S. v. Goldman,26 also a case for the majority, was decided
upon the strength of U. S. v. Moore, supra:
The latest case decided, upon the exact set of facts previous to the
Supreme Court's decision, was U. S. v. Greater New York Live Poultry
Chamber of Conmerce,27 wherein, after listing the case advanced to
17

294 F. 543 (1923).
142 F. 808 (1905).

18

186 F. 1002 (1911).

19

107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319 (1887).

20

128 Wis. 201, 107 N. W. 470 (1906).

16

Carchide v. State, 187 Wis. 438, 204 N. W. 473 (1925); State v. Grosnickle,
189 Wis. 17, 206 N. W. 895 (1925).
22 175 F. 852 (1910).
23 295 F. 576 (1923).
15 F. 593 (1926).
24
25 161 U. S. 591, 16 S. Ct. 644 (1896).
26 28 F. 2d 424 (1928).
27 33 F. 2d 1006 (1929); See also U. S. v. Lay Fish Co., 13 F. 2d 136 (1926).
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support each side consisting of cases mentioned herein, District Judge
Knox ruled that a witness testifying before the grand jury, even though
he does incriminate himself, is not entitled to immunity, unless he
claims his privilege before he testifies.
In concluding the citations of the authorities for both sides it would
be well to give the learned Wigmore's interpretation of the act. He
says: 28 "The anticipatory legislative pardon or immunity is not authorized absolutely but only conditionally upon and in exchange for the
relinquishment of the privilege. The Legislature did not intend to give
something for nothing, i.e. to give immunity merely in exchange for a
testimonial disclosure which it could in any event have gotten by ordinary rules or by the witness' failure to insist on his privilege. The
immunity was intended to be given solely as a means of overcoming
the obstacle of the privilege; and therefore (irrespective of the precise
formality of the judge's procedure) could not come into effect until
that obstacle was explicitly presented and thus needed to be overcome."
Thomas J. Mitchell.

PART Two.'-At a first and cursory perusal of the opinions rendered
in this case, the dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter seems to be a
clearer statement of the law. But a man must go beyond the primary
appraisal of a judicial opinion. Perhaps, one man is able to express his
views in a more intelligible and possibly a more intelligent manner. Intelligibility in itself does not indicate correct facts nor logical reasoning.
The law as such must be divorced from the idyosyncrasies of lawyers
and judges alike. It must be made to stand naked and unadorned if a
critical analysis is to be formulated. Too often men accept the obvious,
abandoning the truth through negligence or -sloth. Too many men will
accept the better written opinion without regard to the truth and principle of the law involved. Men are fallible; judges are only men. Men
are at variance; there are dissenting opinions.
In a discussion of this paper we must not lose sight of the fact that
the majority opinion is the law as it stands now. In all probability it
will remain so.
As a predication of this paper, I think it well to say that this analysis is of the law as it stands today, not as Justice Frankfurter would
have it. I shall attempt to show by analysis and inference, where authority fails, why the majority opinion expresses the correct and preferable law.
4 Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.) § 2282, p. 958.
I The following article expresses the views of the majority opinion in the
preceding case.
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The case arose thus:2 An indictment was returned charging corporations and individuals, including Mr. Monia, with conspiracy to fix prices
in violation of the Sherman Act.3 Mr. Monia alleged that, in obedience
to a subpoena duly served, he appeared as a witness for the United
States before the grand jury inquiring respecting the matters charged
in the indictment and gave testimony. The government then attempted
to prosecute him. He claims immunity under a provision of the Sherman Act that stipulated that no person should be prosecuted concerning the subject matter of his testimony. 4 The United States claims that
since Monia did not at the time claim his immunity, he is not entitled
to be immune now.
The Court held that the decision of the District Court was correct.
In other words it simply stated that a person compelled to testify under oath in a crimial case need not claim his immunity to prosecution
in order to be immune.
This decision seems to be in accord with past precedent, to be concurrent with the intentions of the makers of the Constitution that gave
to every man the privilege of not incriminating himself by his own
testimony, and to be in conformity with every principle of justice
known in our world.
That it is in accord with past precedent is shown when the case of
Heike v. U. S. r is reviewed. It was held that the Sherman Act affords
immunity from prosecution where the evidence in former investigations
does not relate to nor concern the specific charge against him. "The purpose of the statute is to make evidence available and compulsory that
otherwise could not be obtained. It offers no gratuity to crime and
should be construed so far as its words fairly allow the construction,
as coterminous with what otherwise would have been the constitutional
privilege of the person accused." 6
It however has been held that there is no7 immunity when the person
claiming immunity has merely filed answers.
If a witness gives incriminating evidence voluntarily and without
insisting on 'his constitutional privilege, the testimony may be used
against him. But if he is compelled to testify in violation of his privilege
under a statute guaranteeing immunity, the testimony cannot afterwards be used against him.8
2

United States v. Monia, U. S. 63 S. Ct. 409 (1943).

3

Act of 1903, 15 U. S. C. A. 32.

4

Act of 1903, 15 U. S. C. A. 32.

5 Heike v. United States, 57 L. Ed. 450, 227 U. S. 131 (1913).
6 Heike v. United States, 57 L. Ed. 450, 227 U. S. 131 (1913).
7 Simon v. Amer. Tobacco, 192 F. 662 (1912); U. S. v. Stan. Sanitary Co.,
Ann. Cas. 1914C 128.

8 Sandwich v. State, 137 Ala. 85, 34 So. 620 (1903); Steel v. State, 76 Miss.
387, 24 So. 910 (1899); McMasters v. State, 83 Miss. 1, 35 So. 302 (1903).
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The weight of authority acknowleges that there is a constitutional
9
right of not being subject to incrimination by ones own testimony.
And that under the Sherman Act, cases of this type are examples of
the use of incriminating testimony against the -testifier. The whole
question and point of controversy is whether the testifier claims his immunity by words or by significant acts? In United States v. Monia 10
the majority held no. In other words, the immunity arose-as a natural
consequence of the testifier's action in giving testimony as a witness for
the governmept. The minority held that the testifier must claim his
immunity. Let us look to that.
It has been held 11 that no statute which leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers the incriminating question put
to him can have the effect of supplanting the privilege conferred by the
Constitution of the United States. Furthermore, a statutory enactment
to be valid must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution
for offenses to which the question relates.
be abridged or
Several cases have held that this privilege cannot
12
taken away unless complete immunity is provided.
Can it be said with any logic whatsoever, can it be said with any
regard for the doctrine of stare decisis that a man must claim this immunity by express words or actions amounting to the same effect?
13
Hardly so. The person must be afforded absolute immunity. It would
certainly not be thus if he were to be defeated merely because he neglected or failed to ask for such privilege. Complete immunity must be
provided. 14 Can it be complete if the Constitutional privilege is suspended merely because the testifier was ignorant? Such is merely a
technicality in some jurists' minds.
The makers of the Constitution provided that: "Nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
The authors of the Sherman Act and other such acts were willing to
bargain with testifiers to the extent that immunity would be provided
if the individual would exchange pertinent testimony for such immunity. Surely it was not within the contemplation of the makers of
the Constitution that a right impelled by a spirit of justice would have
to be claimed. A man is not required to claim the rights of life, liberty,
and pursuit of happiness. Nor is he required to claim freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press. These rights accrue to him because
9 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 40 L. Ed. 819 (1896); Hale v. Henkel,
201 U. S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652 (1906); Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 55 L. Ed. 771
(1911) ; United States v. Price, 96 F. 960 (1899).

United States v. Monia, U. S. 63 S. Ct. 409 (1943).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 35 L. Ed. 1110, 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
12 United States v. Bell, 81 F. 954 (1897); Wyckoff v. Wagnet Type. Co.,
99 F. 158 (1899); Foot v. Buchanan, 113 Fd. 156 (1902).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 35 L. Ed. 1110, 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
'3
14 United States v. Bell, 81 F. 954 (1897).
1o
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he lives under the Constitution. Why should a distinction be made to
the extent that a man must claim his immunity, when that immunity
has been substituted for his privilege under the Constitution of not being a witness against himself?
Justice demands that technicalities of the type that Mr. Frankfurter
would have imposed be made no requisite for claiming a Constitutional
privilege. A poor man who is inadvised because he can not afford to
retain a staff of lawyers to interpret his rights would be a man without
enforceable rights. Likewise, an ignorant man or a careless lawyer. The
principle is the important thing. The frills and dress are hiding the
issues. The individual is compelled to testify without warning as to his
rights. Certainly, it is in the best interests of the government for whom
he testifies to protect the testifier's interests, even though there are some
who would hold that it is not their duty to do so.
Frankfurter fears that criminals will take advantage of the immunity and escape punishment. If the government has bargained to
give them this immunity in return for specific testimony, why should
they not be able to take advantage of the bargain and be immune without having to claim this immunity in order to give the prosecutor warning? Furthermore, the law holds that this immunity accrues only when
the person is compelled to testify for the government, and that voluntary admissions that might be set up by guilty parties do not give rise
to the immunity. 15
Justice Frankfurter fears that the prosecutor will be at a disadvantage
in not knowing when he is giving immunity. But why in justice's sake
should the prosecutor be placed in any more advantageous position than
the witness testifying? The witness should have the benefit of the doubt
if we are to carry our principle - a man is innocent until he is proved
guilty -to its logical extreme. It should be up to the prosecutor to inform himself as to the facts of the case he is trying. He should be given
no carpet of r6ses.
In conclusion, it certainly seems that from the viewpoint of past
authority, from the intention of the makers of the Constitution, and
from our sense of justice that the majority opinion rendered in United
States v. Monia is a correct, just, and reasonable statement of what
the law is and should be.
John D. Ryan.

15 Sandwich v. State, 137 Ala. 85, 34 So. 620 (1903); Steel v. State, 76 Miss.
387, 24<So. 910 (1899).
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INSANITY AND ITS EFFECT IN DIFFERENT STATES OF CRIMINAL
TRIALs.-Perhaps one of the most important questions which arises in
regard to criminal procedure is the effect of insanity during the different
stages of the criminal trial. This problem is particularly important as a
defense in criminal trials. One of the significant points to notice with
regard to the plea of insanity is just when the accused was stricken with
the infirmity. It is also imperative to examine just what effect the
infirmity has on the mind or reason of the accused. This latter point is
important to the attorney because many of the states have set tests
which are used in determining the ianity of the accused.
In order to examine the effect of insanity in criminal procedure, there
are four different situations which will be discussed. These situations
are as follows: (1) The effect of insanity at the time of the commission
of the criminal act; (2) The effect of insanity after the commission of
the crime and at the time of the trial; (3) The effect of insanity after
the trial but before sentence; and (4) The effect of insanity after the
trial and during execution of sentence. These situations will be discussed in this order so as to provide a reasonable continuity for the
study. But before taking up these four situations, it is interesting to
look at the questions of insanity in its broad aspects and manifestations.
First it is interesting to note the forms of insanity. With regard to
mental function chiefly, insanity may be classified as perceptional, intellectual, and emotional or volitional.' However, it must be said that
not all of these forms are recognized by the law as unassailable defenses for criminal responsibility. 2
The first of these above named forms which was recognized by law
was that of the intellectual variety. It is also interesting to note the
modern test for insanity, namely, the "Right and Wrong Test," had its
origin in the intellectual form of insanity. The test was evolved out of
judicial determination of this type of insanity and it was put forth as a
method of evaluating the intellectual form and the mental capacity of
the accused.3 The recognition of this type of insanity came before the
test was developed.
After the intellectual form had been recognized, the courts made
note of the perceptional type. They applied the test in some cases as to
whether the illusion or the hallucination entertained by the subject
would have justified his action had such illusion or hallucination been
4
real.
In the case of volitional insanity, the courts have been reluctant to
accept it as a defense in criminal actions. Some jurisdictions have ac-

1 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032.
2 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032.
3 10 Clark and Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Reprint 718 (1843).
4 L. R. A. 1917 F. 650 (Note).
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cepted this form when it has been accompanied by some measure of
intellectual insanity, and the courts in these cases, have called the infirmity "irresistible impulse." 5
Emotional insanity, a part of the volitional form, is not accepted
per se by the courts either. However, some courts recognize a distinction
between passion which for a space of time effects a complete derangement of the intellect. This latter form is legal insanity which some courts
will recognize. 6 In the case of Plake v. States,7 the Indiana courts said,
"where the will is overcome by mere passion alone there would be criminal responsibility."
Many courts have stated that regardless of the form of insanity from
which the accused is suffering, he will not be excused from criminal liability just because of the affliction. Different tests will be applied to the
person from which the court will determine whether the defendant will
be held responsible. It is generally conceded that if a person has the
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, mere emotional insanity, passion, or frenzy produced by anger, jealousy or other emotion
8
'will not excuse him from criminal responsibility.
Closely associated with insanity in the popular mind are the cases
of persons who are so-called "weak minded." There is a distinction between these individuals and those who are afflicted with insanity. 9 Many
authorities declare that the mere weakness of mind is not of itself sufficient to excuse the responsibility of a criminal act.' 0
Often the term partial insanity is used to denote these cases of weak
mindedness and emotional insanity. However, regardless of the name
given, the courts look for a test to determine the mental capacity of the
accused to distinguish the right and wrong of his act. The New York
court said in Freeman v. People," that "partial insanity or monomania
is no excuse for crime unless it deprives the party of his reason in regard to the act charged."
In cases of loss of memory, epilepsy and delirium tremens there can
be conditions which will relieve criminal liability provided they are extreme in their effect or coupled with other insanities or other circumstances which will destroy the capacity of the person from distinguishing between right and.wrong.
5
6

7
8

10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033 (Note).
10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033 (Note).
121 Ind. 433, 23 N. E. 273 (1890).
Watson v. State, 177 Ark. 708, 7 S. W. (2d) 980 (1920); Plake v. State,

121 Ind. 433, 23 N. E. 273 (1890).
9 W. B. Pillsbury, Elementary Psychology of the Abnormal, p. 286 - 310,

(1932).
10 Roger v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 57 S. E. 227 (1907); Leache v. State, 22 Tex.
App. 279, 3 S. W. 539 (1886).
11 4 Denio 9, (N. Y.) 47 Am. Dec. 216 (1847).
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It is interesting to note how the law treats with persons who commit
an act while under a delusion. This is best explained by an example.
Suppose A, believing B is an evil spirit and holds an evil influence over
him, kills B thus freeing himself, A, from the evil influence. The courts
call this an insane delusion. The Court of Massachusetts said in the case
of Commonwealth v. Rogers,12 that "if a crime is committed because
of such a delusion, the person committing it is to be judged, so far as
criminal responsibility is concerned, just as if the facts which in his delusion, he believed to be true, were true." A little further along this line,
the California court said in People v. Hurbert,13 that "an insane delusion will not relieve one from criminal responsibility for his act where
the fact upon which it is based would not, if actually existing, excuse
the act."
Other courts refuse to follow this line of the Massachusetts and
California courts. The Alabama court in Parsons v. State,14 said that
"the guilt of one who relies on an insane delusion as a defense cannot
be made to depend upon whether the delusion was such that if things
were as he imagined them to be, he would be justified in the act springing from the delusion."
The Mississippi court falls back on the "Right or Wrong Test" and
says "that delusional insanity is not a defense to a charge of crime unless at the time the accused was unable to distinguish moral right from
wrong."' 5 The Colorado court makes a better refinement than that of
the Mississippi court when in the case of Ryan v. People 16 it said,
"where the evidence of the delusion shows that a person is so insane at
the time of the commission of the act as to be incapable of entertaining
criminal intent, it is in point of law insanity as to all acts resulting from
such delusion. And in such circumstances the act is no more a crime
than a like act would be in a person totally mad." This distinction made
by the Colorado court seems to be quite logical and sound.
Some states have made another refinement in the general field of insanity. These states recognize what is called an "irresistible impulse."
They say that this form is an impulse induced by, and growing out of,
some mental disease affecting the volitive as distinguished from the perceptive powers, so that the person afflicted,' while able to understand
the nature and consequences of the act charged against him and to
perceive that it is wrong, is unable, because of such mental disease, to
resist the impulse to do it.17
However, courts do not agree as to whether the irresistible impulse
is an excuse for crime. Some courts have held that notwithstanding one
7 Met. 500, (Mass). 41 Am. Dec. 458 (1844).
13 119 Cal. 216, 51 P. 329 (1897).
14 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887).
15 Smith v. Smith, 95 Miss. 786, 49 So. 945 (1909).
16 60 Colo. 425, 153 P. 756 (1915).
12
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27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461 (Note).
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ac6used of committing a crime may have been able to comprehend the
nature and consequences of his act and to know it was wrong, nevertheless, if he was -forced to do the act by an impulse which he was powerless to control because of an actual disease of the mind he will be
excused.' 8
On the other hand, many courts refuse to recognize the irresistible
impulse doctrine as a test of criminal responsibility and require that the
"Right and Wrong Test" be complied with before the accused may be
excused. 19 These courts hold the view that an irresistible impulse will
not relieve criminal responsibility unless the disease renders the accused incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong as to the act
committed.
Before proceeding any further it would be helpful to study some of
these tests which have been used by the courts to determine the accused's insanity. Some courts reject all tests of insanity and say that all
cases depend on the circumstances and on the basis that it is erroneous
to treat as a matter of law that which is really a question of fact. 20 Also
in Illinois, the court said in Happs v. People 21 that "in order to make
insanity a good defense it must appear that at the time of the crime,
the defendant was not of sound mind, and afflicted with insanity, and
that the affliction was the cause of the act, and the act would not have
been done except for the affliction."
As we have seen certain courts depend on the "irresistible impulse
test." However, more courts depend on the "Right and Wrong Test."
This test had its foundation in the English case called M'Naghton's
Case.22 Here the judges put down the rule that at the time of committing the act, the part r accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as to be unaware of the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or if he had known it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong. After this was put forth some courts
construed the.rule as referring to the power to distinguish between right
and wrong conduct in general. 23 More courts had adopted the view
that the capacity of the accused to distinguish right from wrong in respect to the act charged as a crime at the time from wrong in respect
to the act as a crime at the time of its commission is made the test of
his responsibility and not his capacity or ability to distinguish right
from wrong in the abstract.2 4 And as American Jurisprudence25 so apt18 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577,"2 So. 854 (1887); Stevens v. State, 31 Ind.
485, 99 Am. Dec. 634 (1869).

19 People v. Hurbert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 P. 329 (1897); People v. Schmidt, 216
N. Y. 324, 110-N. E. 945 (1915).
20 State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871).
21
22

31 Ill.
385, 83 Am. Dec. 231 (1863).
10 Clark and Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Reprint 718 (1843).

23
24

Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485, 99 Am. Dec. 634 (1869).
Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20 (1879); Hornish v. People,
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ly puts it, "if a person at the time of the commission of an alleged crime
has sufficient capacity to understand the nature and quality of the particular act or acts constituting the crime and to know whether they are
right or wrong, he is responsible if he commits such act whatever may
be his capacity in other particulars, but if he does not possess this degree of capacity, then he is not so responsible. 20 Thus, if a person is
entirely sane, except in one act, and he commits that act his defense is
complete. And on the other hand we can say that if a person has knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and will deserve punishment, then whatever may be his mental weakness, he is in
the eyes of the law of sound mind and memory and will be subject to
27
punishment.
It is very interesting to note in passing that where the question of
the determination of the issue of insanity as a defense is raised that in
certain jurisdictions where judges are permitted to comment upon the
weight and value of evidence, it has been held proper for the court to
caution the jury concerning this defense which judicial experience has
shown to be often attempted by contrivance and perjury, but instructions by the trial court which are designed to cast discredit or suspicion upon the defense are not regarded with favor.28 However, Missouri is an example of those states which allow its juries to bring in a
general "not guilty," verdict in cases of insanity. 0
With these rather general remarks about insanity and its forms, let
us turn now to our original four situations. Besides giving the general
jurisdictions and their method of handling them, we will also put forth
the way Michigan holds under the situations.
I.
Effect of Insanity at the Time of Commission of the Criminal Act.
Our first situation is the effect of insanity at the time of the commission of the criminal act. It seems to be well settled in all jurisdictions
that a person cannot be legally punished or held criminally responsible
for an act done by him while insane, although such act would be criminal if done by a sane person. In Utah for example, the court said in
State v. Brown 31 that "since a criminal intent is an essential element
620, 32 N. E. 677 (1892).
142 Ill.
25
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Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 67, 57 S. E. 227 (1907); People v. Marquis, 344
Ill. 261, 176 N. E. 314 (1931); Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485, 99 Am. Dec. 634
(1861).
27 Rogers v. State, 128 Ga. 57 S.E. 227 (1907).
28
State v. Jones, So N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871).
30 State v. Porter, 213 Mo. 43, 111 S. W. 529 (1908).
81 36 Utah 46, 102 P. 641 (1909).
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of crime, if by reason of insanity a person is incapable of forming any
intent, he cannot be regarded as guilty by law."
In the case of State v. Kearl,32 the court of Montana said that
"there are forms of mental deficiency or derangement which will not excuse the commission of crime. The mental derangement which will excuse must be such as to render the one afflicted therewith incapable of
forming a criminal intent."
Then, of course, many of the questions which we have already dealt
with come up under this, our first situation. Such cases of emotional
insanity, partial insanity, and delusions come up as points of determining whether the accused is really insane. For example, in case of weak
minded people, the court of Illinois, said in the case of People v. Marquer 33 that unless the mentality of such a person is of such a subnormal character as to render him incapable of distinguishing between
right and wrong, in which case it is undoubtedly a defense." The New
Jersey courts said that "the law doesn't require full possession of one's
faculties in full vigor or a mind unimpaired by disease or infirmity to
be the basis for which the criminal responsibility for a crime is determined." 34
The Michigan Courts have held, along with all the other jurisdictions, that when a person is insane at the time he commits a criminal
act, he is not criminally responsible. This is in line with our first situation.
II.
The Effect of Insanity After Commission of the Crime and Before Trial.
The second situation which is to be examined is the effect of insanity
after the commission of the crime and at the time of the trial. The rule
at Common Law and by statute in many jurisdictions is well settled
35
that a person while insane cannot be tried, sentenced, or executed.
The court of New York in Freeman v. People 36 said that "it is obvious
that if the accused is tried while insane, his insanity may disable him
from making a rational defense." In many jurisdictions, if at any time
while criminal proceedings are pending against a person accused of a
crime, whether before, during or after the trial, the trial court, either
from observation or upon the suggestion of counsel, has facts brought
to its attention which raise a doubt of the sanity of the defendant, the
32

29 Mont. 508, 75 P. 362 (1904).

33

344 Il. 261, 176 N. E. 314 (1931).
State v. James, 96 N. J. L. 132, 114 A. 553 (1921).

34

35 Tucker v. Hayatt, 151 Ind. 332, 51 N. E. 469 (1898); Hawie v. State, 121
Miss. 197, 83 So. 158 (1919).
36

4 Denio 9, (N. Y.) 47 Am. Dec. 216 (1847).
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question should be settled before further steps are taken.3 7 This is the
general rule in all the states, but closely akin to this question is the
procedure, manner and method of bringing the question before the court
at the end of trial.
In Re Smith 38 the court said that "the method of settling the question of insanity is generally within the discretion of the trial court."
However, in other cases the court has held that the court itself can enter upon the inquiry or submit the question to a jury impanelled for
that purpose. 3 9 Also in the case of Freeman v. People 40 the court said
that "a trial of the question of present insanity is not a trial of an indictment but is reliminary to such trial, and the object is simply to
determine whether the person charged with an offense and alleged to
be insane shall be requested to plead and proceed to the trial of the
main issues of guilty or not guilty."
The courts have definite tests which will preclude trial. For example,
in the case of Freeman v. People,4 the court said that "the broad
question is whether the accused, in so far as it may devolve upon him,
may have a full, fair and impartial trial. An important part of this question is whether the accused is mentally competent to make a rational
defense." It is proper to inquire whether the accused, by reason of insanity, comprehends his position, whether he has mind and discretion
which will enable him to appreciate the charge against him and the proceedings thereon, or whether he is mentally capable of rendering his attorney such assistance as a proper defense to the indictment preferred
against him demands. 42 And again, in Freeman v. People 4 3 the courts
said "if the person can comprehend his situation as to the charge against
him, he will be deemed to be sane, although on some other subjects his
mind may be deranged or unsound."
The question presents itself in line with this second situation, what
is the recourse of a person who is tried even though insane? The answer
is that there are various remedies. In sorme jurisdictions, an application
for a writ of error corom nobis is proper. 44 Other courts have recognized
the right of the defendant, after conviction, to raise by a motion for a
new trial the question of his sanity at the time of the trial. 45 In still

other jurisdictions, the judgment has been reserved on appeal or error,
where the trial judge refused to inquire into the insanity of the accused
37 Ferguson v. Martineau, 115 Ark. 317, 171 S. W. 472 (1914); Hawie v.
State, 125 Miss. 589, 88 So. 167 (1921).
38 25 N. M. 48, 176 P. 819 (1918).

39
40
41
42

Weiland v. State, 58 Okla. Crim. Rep. 108, 50 P. (2d) 741 (1935).
4 Denio 9 (N. Y.) 47 Am. Dec. 216 (1847).
4 Denio 9 (N. Y.) 47 Am. Dec. 216 (1847).

Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S. W. 327 (1911).
4 Denio 9 (N. Y.) 47 Am. Dec. 216 (1847).
44 Hawie v. State, 121 Miss. 197, 83 So. 158 (1919).
45, 10 A. L. R. 215 (Note).
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or refused to admit evidence offered to -prove defendant's insanity.46
In Michigan the statutes provide that a write of habeas corpus shall
be had by the victim or by some friend in his behalf upon a proper
petition to the circuit court of the county in which the said hospital is
47
situated.
Keeping in mind our second situation, the statutes of Michigan provide for this event. However, the same statute provides for the third
situation also; namely, the effect of insanity after the trial but before
sentence. This statute 48 provides: "If it is claimed that such person
became insane after the commission of the felony with which he is
charged and before or during the trial thereon, the test on the trial of
such issue shall be whether such person is capable of understanding the
nature and object of the proceedings against him and of comprehending
his own condition in reference to such proceedings, and of assisting in
his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. If such person is found
insane, the judge of said court shall order that he be discharged from
imprisonment and that he be turned over to the sheriff for safe custody
and removal to the Ionia State Hospital, to which hospital such person
shall be committed to remain until restored to sanity, and that fact has
been determined by the superintendent of said hospital or by any other
proceeding authorized by this section; the said superintendent of said
hospital shall forthwith certify that fact in writing to said judge and
prosecuting attorney. The judge shall thereupon immediately require
the sheriff without delay to bring such person from said hospital and
place him in proper custody until he is remanded to prison, brought to
trial- or judgment as the case may be, or is legally discharged."
Thus we see in Michigan, the statute provides that if the insanity
develops after the commission of the crime and before, during, or at
the end of the trial, the whole criminal proceeding is suspended and the
accused is tried by jury on the issue of his insanity. If he is pronounced
sane, he is returned to trial and the criminal proceedings go on where
they were interrupted. If the accused is pronounced insane, he is committed to the Ionia State Hospital. When he regains his sanity he is
bound over to the court again which proceeds with the criminal prosecution where it was interrupted by the issue of the accused's insanity.
III.
The Effect of Insanity After the Trial But Before Sentence.
The Michigan statute is clear on this point. The proceedings are interrupted until the issue of sanity has been tried and the person is
A. L. R. 215 (Note).
Michigan Statutes Annotated, Vol. 25, p. 300, § 28.967 (1937).
Mich. Stat. Ann., Vol. 25, p. 300, § 28.967 (1937). Also see same statute
for reference as to procedure of court in testing the issue of insanity and the
46
47
48
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judged sane or insane. In either case he is returned to the criminal proceeding and the court to render judgment. In case of insanity if the
accused should regain his sanity, the same rule applies. The same provisions are made in other jurisdictions. If the question of present sanity
is raised after verdict but before sentence, the court may cause the sentence to be stayed until the question is determined. 4 9 Upon restoration
to sanity one, who becomes insane only after the commission of a
crime, may be punished the same as if he had always been sane.
IV.
The Effect of Insanity Alter Trial and During the Execution of
Sentence.
This is the fourth situation under which we are to examine the effect
of insanity. Before we see what the different courts hold on this situation, there is one thing which almost all the courts recognize. This fact
is that if a person is sane at the time of the crime and at the trial and
sentence but claims to have become insane during his confinement, he
does not have an absolute right to a trial to determine his present mental condition unless expressly conferred by statute. The reason behind
this rule is that if the convicted person were permitted to have a trial
as an absolute right on their mental condition and thus be released from
jail for treatment it would be tantamount to granting them the privilege
of thwarting the administration of criminal justice for an indefinite
period. Thus even a person in confinement awaiting the execution of
the death penalty has no legal right except where the right is conferred
by statute to have an inquisition into their mental condition. The instituting of such a proceeding is within the discretion of the court or
executive having jurisdiction in such matters.9 0 However, in some jurisdictions it is held that the court which pronounced the sentence does not
hereafter have power to stay execution and the only recourse the prisoner has is an appeal to the governor. 51 On the other hand, certain jurisdictions have held that the court has authority, frequently conferred by
statute, to stay execution of a sentence for the purpose of instituting an
inquiry into the sanity of the prisoner.52 In some jurisdictions the duty
of the court either to pass upon the question of the sanity of a person
under sentence of death or to impanel a jury for that purpose is mandatory, where an application is made and a sufficient showing made to
method of calling two qualified physicians for their examination. The statute provides for a jury trial in the issue of insanity.
49 Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U. S. 398, 42 L. Ed. 515 (1897).
51 Ex parte Wilson, 19 W. N. C. 37 (Pa.) (1887); 49 A. L. R. 807.
52 Ex parte State ex rel Atty. Gen. 150 Ala. 489, 43 So. 490 (1907) ; Ferguson
v. Martineau, 115 Ark. 317, 171 S. W. 472 (1914).
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raise a doubt. In line with this the courts of Nebraska and Georgia said
that if the court fails to take this prescribed action, an appeal may be
taken. 53
It is interesting to see the test which some of the jurisdictions apply
to the question of insanity in the situation of the prisoner's appeal after
he has been convicted. In the case of Re Smith 5- in New Mexico, the
court said "the test to determine the sanity of a person about to be
executed is whether he has at the time of the examination sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, the
purpose of the punishment, his fate awaiting him - a sufficient understanding to know any fact which might exist which would make his
punishment unjust or unlawful and the intelligence requisite to convey
such information to his attorneys or to the court." This reasoning is
generally recognized by most of the courts in this country.
Another question which arises with regard to this fourth situation is
who may bring up the issue of the prisoner's sanity. In line with this,
in the case of In Re Smith 55 the court said that "where the sanity of a
person held under the death penalty is questioned before the court or
other public official, who has jurisdiction, an investigation of the mental
condition of the prisoner will be ordered if the court has any doubt of
such person's sanity." But where this procedure is not regulated by
statute, it would seem that the suggestion of the insanity of the person
need not be made by any particular individual. 56 However, each state
seems to allow many different people to bring the question up. In Georgia, for example, the court may raise the question and act in such matter by its own motion. 57 In Kentucky the court said in the case of
Davidson v. Commonwealth 58 that "the officer holding the person in
custody is the one who must raise the question." However, it is generally held by most of the states that an interested person such as the
attorney for the person when he was tried can bring the question. 59 In
the case of Baker v. State 60 the court of Nebraska said that "sometimes
the warden of the penitentiary where the prisoner is confined is authorized by statute to give notice to a judge of the court of the county where
the person is located if the prisoner appears to be insane. But if the
warden refuses to take action in such case, the prisoner's attorney can
apply to the court for an examination."
53 Barker v. State, 75 Neb. 289, 106 N. W. 450 (1905); Sears v. State, 112
Ga. 382, 37 S. E. 443 (1900).
54 25 N.M. 48, 176 P. 819 (1918).
55 25 N. M. 48, 176 P. 819 (1918).
56 Ex parte Chesser, 111 S. 720 (Fla., 1927).
57 Baughn v. State, 100 Ga. 554, 28 S. E. 68 (1897).
58
174 Ky. 789, 192 S. W. 846 (1917).
59 State v. Nordstrom, 21 Wash. 403, 58 P. 248 (1899); See 49 A. L. R.
808 (Note).
60 75 Neb. 289, 106 N. W. 450 (1905).
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In the states where statutes apply to this question the statute must
be followed and no other person except those provided for can bring
the matter up. For example, in Commonwealth v. Barnes 61 the court
of Pennsylvania said concerning its statute that "where the statute provides that the question of a person held under sentence shall be raised
by application of the superintendent, jail phycisians, warden, or other
chief executive officers of the institution or other responsibile person, the
term 'other responsible person' refers to people connected with the
penal institution where the person is confined and no others." Just how
Michigan handles this situation will be discussed a bit later.
Another interesting point to be brought up under this question is,
what is the manner of raising the issue? In the case of Nobels v. Georgia 62 the Federal court said that "in the absence of statute, the question
of the existence of insanity which has supervened subsequent to the
trial may be raised in an- informal way before the trial judge; no technical nicety of pleading is required." However, in Florida, the court
said that "the question cannot be raised by habeas corpus, but should
be raised by petition supported by affidavits of fact sufficient to make
a prima facie showing of insanity." 63 Then in Pennsylvania the court
has said that "a petition based upon the belief of the petitioner as to insanity of the prisoner and supporting affidavits, not giving anything
more in detail and with no allegations as to whether the alleged insanity
occurred after the trial or when the case was tried, does not make a
sufficient showing of insanity or require the court to which it is presented to inquire into the question of insanity." 64
Perhaps a good summary of these reasons for this interest in insanity after conviction of the person is shown by the opinion of the
Attorney General of Georgia. 65 He said "upon the theory that the stay
of execution to investigate the sanity of a prisoner is based upon the
public will and sense of propriety rather than any right in the prisoner,
the latter is not entitled as a matter of right to a judicial investigation,
and that any investigation had is merely to inform the court imposing
the sentence as to the mental condition of the prisoner, for the sole
purpose of determining whether it would be consistent with public decency and propriety to take away the life of a person who was not sane
enough to realize what was being done. It has been held that the question of sanity of a person held under sentence of death should be raised
in the court imposing the sentence, since such a person is technically in
the custody of the court to see that the sentence is executed."
61
62

63
64
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280 Pa. 351, 124 A. 636 (1924).
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With this general discussion of the problem and how the other states
handle the matter let us turn to Michigan. In this state the whole problem is handled by statute. The first important statute refers to the
"Transfer of Insane Convicts." 66 This law says that whenever a physician of one of the various Michigan prisons shall certify to the warden
of the prison or other officer of the institution that an inmate is insane,
it shall be the duty of such officer to make an examination into the condition of such inmate, and if he is satisfied of the insanity, then he
shall immediately cause the prisoner to be transferred to the Ionia
State Hospital. This statute also provides that if any person who has
been treated in the Ionia State Hospital before, or who has been sentenced to prison before and is received in any of the state hospitals, he
must be transferred to Ionia State Hospital at once. Thus we can see
that if the prisoner is insane while being confined, he will be transferred
to the state insane hospital upon regular- examination and prescribed
methods.
Another Michigan statute 67 provides that in case the insanity of
any criminal in Ionia State Hospital shall continue after the expiration
of his sentence, the superintendent of the hospital shall, within five
days after the expiration, make application to the judge of probate of
the county where the hospital is located for an order to retain the convict in the hospital until he shall be restored -to reason. The judge of
probate, upon receipt of application shall notify the persons concerned
and the attorney general of the state and shall fix a time for a hearing.
The judge shall appoint two physicians to examine the prisoner. If the
convict is indeed insane, the judge may also compel witnesses to attend.
This statute goes on and provides that whenever any convict confined
in Ionia State Hospital shall have recovered his sanity and this is certified by the superitendent of the said hospital, before the end of his
original sentence in a penal institution, the prisoner shall be forthwith
transferred back to said penal institution from whence he came. The
statute also provides that if the convict's sentence has expired and he
is still committed to the State Hospital, the superintendent may parole
the man as he sees fit within the rules as prescribed by the State Hospital Commission. In line with this statute the Attorney General rendered an opinion in 1935 in which he said, "a patient whose sentence
has expired has no legal right to demand a jury in proceedings to retain
such patient at Ionia State Hospital until restored to reason." 6s
Another Michigan statute 69 provides that- before an inmate of the
Ionia State Hospital is discharged at the expiration of his sentence, the
66 Michigan Statutes Annotated, Vol. 10, § 14.854 and 855, Transfer of

Patients with Homicidal Tendencies (1937).
67
68
69

Michigan Statutes Annotated, Vol, 10, § 14.856 (1937).
Opinion of Attorney General, April 9, 1935.
Michigan Statutes Annotated, Vol. 10, § 14.857 (1937).
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superintendent shall notify his relatives, or if he has none, the sheriff
of his county, and the judge of probate there, and the judge shall issue
orders that the sheriff shall receive the prisoner and bring him before
the judge. He will hold a hearing as to the convict's situation and future interests.
The State of Michigan has recognized a rather important modern
form of insanity. It is termed criminal sexual insanity. The statute 70
says that "any person who is suffering from a mental disorder and is
not insane or feebleminded, which mental disorder has existed for a
period of not less than one year and is coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses is hereby declared to be a sexual
psychopathic person." Then, further, the statutes provide the methods
of a trial on these grounds. 71 This statute then provides that "no person who is found in such original hearing to be a criminal sexual psychopathic person and such finding having become final, may thereafter be
tried upon the offense with which he originally stood charged in the
committing court at the time of the filing of the original petition. Thus
Michigan has well covered the four situations which we have under
consideration.
The treatment of these four situations has been dealt with here from
the standpoint of statutory and common law procedure in criminal
cases, with particular treatment of the Michigan statutes for the reason
that Michigan has completely covered the four situations outlined here,
in statutes on crimes and criminal procedure.
Charles Boynton.

SECURITY PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE CHANDLER AcT.-The National
Bankruptcy Act ' took its present form in 1898. Its purpose among
others "...
is to distribute the assets of the bankrupt equitably among
his creditors .... "2 In order to arrive at this stated purpose, there were
included in the Act means of preventing a creditor of a certain class
from obtaining more than his share of the bankrupt's assets. One of the
more important of these was Section 60 which provided that certaini
transfers by the bankrupt to a creditor were voidable by the trustee in
bankruptcy.3 Its object was to strike down secret liens which depleted
the assets of the bankrupt and prevented an equal distribution among

70 Michigan Statutes Annotated, Vol. 25, § 28.967 (1) (1942).
71 Michigan Statutes Annotated, Vol. 25, § 28.967 (2), (3), (4), (5), (6),
and (7) (1942).
72

Michigan Statutes Annotated, Vol. 25, § 28.967 (8) (1942).

111U. S. C. A.

Gilbert's Collier on Bankruptcy (4th Edition) 1937, p. 4.
3 Section 60, 11 U. S. C. A. § 96.
2
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the creditors. Section 60 has been amended from time to time to more
fully accord with this purpose. In 1903, it was amended to prolong the
running of the time, i. e., the time in which a transfer must be completed
to be valid aginst the trustee in bankruptcy. This 1903 amendment provided that the transfer was deemed made at the date of recording, when
recording was required by state law.4 This did not necessarily mean,
however, that the transfer was to be tested as to its preferential character at the time of recording and not at the time of transfer. 5 Thus, a
mortgage given for present consideration but not recorded until later
was not regarded as having been given for an antecedent debt, 6 and if
the mortgagor was insolvent at the time the mortgage was recorded, but
solvent at the time the mortgage was given, the transaction was held
not to be a preference since the date of determination was still that of
7
the original transfer.
The 1910 amendment to Section 60 (b) ruled that the time of
recording, when recording was required, should be the date for determining when the transfer took place. The state law relative to registration or recording determined whether or not a transfer was to be registered or recorded.8 A transfer was required to be recorded within the
intention of this section in those cases in which, under the state law,
recording was necessary to make the transfer valid as against general
creditors 9 or lien holders..' 0
In 1926, Section 60 was amended again adding to sub (a)" the
words, "or permitted." However, these words were not added to sub
(b), and a conflict arose concerning the proper interpretation. Some
courts held that recordation still would not operate as a voidable preference where the recording was only permitted. 12 Other courts held
that subs (a) and (b) should be read together and that where recording was permitted, but the instrument was not actually recorded until
within four months of bankruptcy, the recordation would operate as a
voidable preference. 13
In 1938, Section 60 was again amended and a transfer was deemed
a voidable preference when it allowed one or more creditors to get a
greater share of the bankrupt's estate when the transaction was not so
In re Klein, 197 Fed. 241 (1912).
In re Sturtevant, 188 Fed. 196 (1911).
6 In re Jackson Brick and Tile Co., 189 Fed. 636 (1911).
7 MAtee v. Shade, 185 Fed. 442 (1910).
8 Hawkins v. Dannenberg Co., 234 Fed. 752 (1916).
9 Marsh v. Leseman et al., 242 Fed. 484 (1917).
10 Hawkins v. Dannenberg Co., 234 Fed. 752 (1916).
11 Sub (a) defines which transfers are preferences and sub (b) defines which
preferences are voidable.
12 First National Bank of Lincoln, Neb., et. al. v. Livestock National Bank,
31 F. (2d) 416 (1929); Bank of Wadesboro v. Little, 71 F. (2d) 513 (1934).
13 Foltz v. Davis, 68 F. (2d) 495 (1934); In re Jackson, 9 Fed. Supp. 717
(1935).
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far perfected that a bona fide purchaser and a creditor could thereafter
have obtained rights superior to that of the transferee. 14
The scope of this article is limited to a discussion of the operation
of the Bankruptcy Act as concerns voidable preferences of the common
security transactions. It might be well to say now that in all the instances mentioned hereafter where only one element of a voidable
preference is discussed, in order that the preference be voidable, all
other necessary elements must also be present.
Pledges
The holder of property under a valid pledge agreement is not affected by the new provisions of the Act. However, those who attempt
to assert an equitable lien 15 under a pledge agreement will find their
position untenable. A bona fide purchaser from a pledgor is able to
obtain rights superior to those of the pledgee when the property does
not go into the hands of the pledgee. Under previous law, the pledgee
could assert his rights over those of a trustee in bankruptcy, to the decided disadvantage of the other creditors by invoking the doctrine of
"relation bank" to enforce his agreement. 16 Under the new provisions,
the transfer to perfect an equitable pledge within four months of the
filing of the petition is deemed complete at a date immediately preceding bankruptcy and is a voidable preference. 17 The Act's application
14 Section 60. Preferred Creditors-a. A preference is a transfer, as defined
in this Act; of any of the property of a debtor to or for -the benefit of a creditor
for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while
insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the petition
in bankruptcy, or of the original petition under Chapter X, XI, XII, and XIII
of this Act, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater perceiltage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class. For
the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall be deemed
to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona
fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any
rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein,
and, if such transfer is not so perfected prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, or of the original petition under Chapters X, XI, XII or XIII of this
Act, it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy.
b. Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at
the time when -the transfer if made, reasonable cause to believe that-the debtor is
insolvent.
15 An imperfect pledge due to lack of delivery. Goldstein v. Rusch, 56 F.
(2d) 10 (1932).
16 Van Slyke v. Huntington, 256 Fed. 86 (1919); Root Mfg. Co. v. Johnson, 241 U. S. 160, 36 S. Ct. 520, 60 L. Ed. 1934 (1916); Contra: Kirst v. Buffalo
Cold Storage Co., 36 Fed. Supp. 401 (N. Y., 1940). In this case the court described an equitable lien as "a secret one of which no opportunity of discovery
was given to others."
17 Weinstein, Bankruptcy Law of 1938, p. 120; Lane v. School-pistrict of
Montessen, 120 F. (2d) 479 (C. C. A., 3d, 1941). Case decided under previous law.
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to pledged property in the hands of the bankrupt for a temporary and
limited purpose only has been strongly opposed by a noted writer.18
Assignments of Accounts Receivable
The States are rather evenly divided in their judicial outlook concerning the rights of a prior assignee of accounts receivable over a subsequent assignee who first gives notice to the debtor of the assignment.
In the States holding that the assignee who first notifies the debtor of
the assignment has a prior equity on the account, 19 the test set up by
Section 60 would allow the trustee in bankruptcy to prevail over the
assignee of an account from the bankrupt, who does not give the notice
20
until within four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
In the States which allow the assignee first in point of time to prevail
over subsequent assignees, 2 ' the giving of notice to the debtor within
the four month period should not operate as a voidable preference.
The application of the Act to the situations above seems rather clear,
but an important problem arises as to the extent the courts should go
to apply the test. In all transactions involving assignments of accounts
receivable, there are certain situations in which a subsequent assignee
can obtain superior rights to those of an assignee first in point of time.
"Whatever view may be entertained as to the English doctrine which
prefers the assignee who first gives notide, the second assignee (assuming that he paid value-in good faith for his assignment), or that if
a volunteer he took in good faith, and the first assignee also was a
volunteer) is in several contingencies clearly entitled to supplant the
first assignee, e.g., (1) if acting in good faith he obtains payment of
the claim assigned; or, (2) if he reduced his claim to a judgment in his
own name; or, (3) if he affects a novation with the obligor, whereby
the obligation in favor of the assignor is superseded by a new one running to himself; or, (4) if he obtains the document containing the obThe facts present the precise situation and result that the new test would strike
down.
18 Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences (Rev. ed., 1940) p. 835;
For the leading case decided under former law, see Sexton v. Kessler & Co. 225
U. S. 90, 30 S. Ct. 657, 36 L. Ed. 995.
19 California-City of Los Angeles v. Knapp, 60 P. (2d) 127; Adamson v.

Paonessa, 180 Cal. 530, 179 P. 880 (1919).
Mississippi-Canton Exchange Bank v. Yazoo County, 144 Miss. 579, 109 So.
1 (1926).
Missouri-Klebba v. Struempf, 224 Mo. App. 193, 23 S. W. (2d) 205 (1930).
Tennessee-Peters v. Goetz, 136 Tenn. 257, 188 S.W. 1144 (1916).
20 In re Reim Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 855 (Md., 1941).
21 Iowa-Ottumwa Boiler Works v. M. J. O'Meara & Sons, 206 Iowa 577,
218 N. W. 920 (1928).
Massachusetts-Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bagg, 197 N. E. 481 (1935).
New Jersey-Moorestown Trust Co. v. Buzby, 109 N. J. Eq. 409, 157 A. 663

(1932).

1

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ligation when the latter is in the form of a specialty. In all these cases,
having obtained a legal right in good faith and for value, the prior assignee cannot deprive him of this legal right." 22
The Restatement of Contracts agrees that in the happening of these
contingencies, the rights of the subsequent assignee will prevail over
those of the prior assignee, 23 and adds another, "A subsequent assignee
acquires a right against the obligor to the exclusion of a prior assignee
if the prior assignment is revocable or voidable by the assignor." 24
If the courts strictly apply the act, an assignee of accounts receivable
would be left at the mercy of the solvency of his assignor. The method
of handling these transactions has been crticized as being inequitable
to the other creditors. 25 It becomes a question of economic policy
whether or not the present methods are to prevail and if this is decided in the affirmative, it lies within the power of the States to protect these security devices by statute or judicial opinion.
Chattel Mortgages
It is somewhat difficult to generalize too much on the subject of
chattel mortgages 26 under the new provisions of Section 60, but it is
safe to says almost all of the state recording acts provide that a chattel
mortgage is invalid as against a bona fide purchaser which is the
test set up by the Act.
The law seems rather well settled that one who loans money to the
bankrupt and at that time takes no security, but who later receives a
mortgage from the bankrupt within the four months preceding bankruptcy has received a voidable preference. 21 The question which is
troublesome arises when a mortgage is given at the time of the loan
and is not recorded until within four months of bankruptcy.
To illustrate the workings of the law as concerns chattel mortgages,
it might be best to use two typical examples of transactions. Where A
loans money to B and receives either a mortgage which he immediately
records or possession of B's goods as security, he is in almost every
instance protected by state law from future creditors and bona fide
purchasers, and he retains this protection when bankruptcy intervenes.
This is true even if the transaction occurs during the four months pre2 Williston, Contracts (1936) p. 1260, and cases cited.
§ 173, sub, b.
24 Id., sub, a.
25 In 32 F. Supp. 26, at 28 (1940).
26 For a discussion on the allied questions of mortgages containing after acquired property clauses and mortgages on animals and crops not yet in existence,
see 3 Coll. on Bankruptcy, 14th Ed., par. 60.42, pp. 933-934 and par. 60.50, pp.
975 ff.
27 Bush v. Seymour, (D. N. H., 1939), 43 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 811, 30 F.
Supp. 202 (1939).
22
23
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ceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition, because in such a case,
present consideration has been given for the transfer.28 However, it is
the lax holder of a chattel mortgage as security who must change his
ways or find his position threatened by the intervention of bankruptcy. 29 If A loans money to B in June, 1940, and receives in exchange
a chattel mortgage which he does not record until June, 1941, when B
is insolvent and A has reasonable cause to know of B's insolvency, and
a petition in bankruptcy is filed in August, 1941, A's position as security holder should be untenable under the new provisions, as all the elements of a preference are present. There is a transfer of an interest in
property effected by the recording; the mortgagee is a creditor; the
transfer is made in payment of an antecedent debt (created one year
before recordation) 8 0 and the estate has been diminished by the value
of the property; the bankrupt is insolvent; and the mortgagee not only
had reasonable cause to know of this insolvency, but he had actual
knowledge of B's insolvency.
It must be remembered that the Act as applied to these security
devices may be varied by the laws of the different states regarding both
the nature of the transaction and the protection afforded by them. 81
Conditional Sales
Due to the uniqueness of the transaction in conditional sales, the
courts have experienced difficulty in determining the proper method of
dealing with them as preferences. At the present time, almost all of the
States have a statute requiring their recordation for validity against
bona fide purchasers from the vendee. It seems apparent that the Act
would include them in its operation and the recordation within the four
months preceding the filing of the petition would result in a voidable
preference. However, the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 8 2 held that there could be no void-

able preference in the case of conditional sales because there was no
transfer as defined in the Act. 88 "The ownership was not transferred,
28 Not a diminution of the estate of the bankrup~t. Bachner v. Robinson,
(C. C. A., 2d) 41 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 172, 107 F. (2d) 513 (1939); In re Webb
Grocery Co., 32 F. Supp. 3 (M. D. Tenn., 1940), the case was decided on other

grounds but the court ruled that recording within a reasonable time would serve
to make the transaction one continuing process and thus be for a present consideration.
29 In First National Bank v. Connet, (C. C. A. 8th) 14 Am. B. R. 662, 142
Fed. 33, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 148 (1905), the court stated: "A plain and inexpensive method is prescribed by which a mortgagee may secure a priority of lien, and
the evil results that may follow from ignoring it are obvious."
30 See section on Determination of Antecedent Indebtedness, infra.
81
32
83

3 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) § 60.39, p. 899.
239 U. S. 268, 60 L. Ed. 275, 35 S. Ct. 50 (1915).
Words and Phrases, 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (25) (1927) -

definition of transfer: "Transfer shall include the sale and every other and different mode of dis-
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but only the possession, and it was transferred to the bankrupts, not
from them. Being only conditional purchasers, they were not to become
the owners until the condition was performed. No doubt the right to
perform it and thereby to acquire the ownership was a property right.
But this right was not surrendered or encumbered. On the contrary, it
remained with the bankrupts, and ultimately passed to the trustee, who
was free to exercise it for the benefit of the creditors. So, there was no
dimunition of the bankrupt's estate." 34
The Chandler Act has changed the definition of the word, "transfer"
as used in the Act,35 but inasmuch as the Court reached- such a conclusion under the former definition, it is altogether possible that the
same result might again be reached, although the new definition is infinitely broader. The next move, then, it would seem, would be for the
Supreme Court to either repudiate its former holding or declare it still
in effect and thus greatly decrease the perplexity of the proper application of the Act to conditional sales transactions.
Trust Receipts
Trust receipts furnish a problem similar to those of conditional
sales.86 The courts have been quite puzzled in their attitude toward
them because of the diversity of opinion as to their legal nature. The
prevailing rule is that tripartite trust receipt transactions are not classed
as chattel mortgages 37 or conditional sales 38 as far as the recording
statutes are concerned. There has been a movement for applicable recording statutes but the contention has been strongly asserted that the need
for them is not sufficiently great to justify their passage.39 The ordinary
posing of or parting with property, or the possession of property, absolutely or
conditionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage or security."
34 Words and Phrases, 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (25) (1927) definition of transfer: "Transfer shall include the sale and every other and different mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the possession of property, absolutely or
conditionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage or security."
35 Words and Phrases, 11 U. S. C. A. § 1 (30) (1941 Supp.). "Transfer shall
include the sale and every other and different mode, direct or indirect, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest therein or with the possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest therein, absolutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceeding as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance, gift, security or otherwise.

36 In a tripartite trust receipt transaction, title never passes to the dealer, but
goes directly to the financing agency.

37 Moors v. Drury, 186 Mass. 424, 71 N. E. 810 (1904); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N. W. 627 (1925).
38

In re James, Inc., (C. C. A., 2d) 13 Am. B. R. (N. S.) 304, 30 F. (2d)

555 (1929) ; Cooley, Cases on Sales, (2d Ed.) 239.

39 In Matter of James, note 37 at 558, the court said: "It has been recognized that there are sound business reasons why it is unnecessary to record trust
receipts ......
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purchases in the course of business are protected by the doctrine of ap-

parent authority, 40 and in some States, by the Factor's Acts. 41 The
U. T. R. A. gives superior rights to a bona fide purchaser in the ordinary
42
course of business even though recorded as required by the Act.
The validity of trust receipts has been upheld several times in bankruptcy cases, 43 but it seems the new test should operate to enable the,
trustee to avoid them as preferences if goods are turned over to the
transferee within the four month period. The court intimated such a
result under previous law in the case of In re Cattus.4 4 This case involved a trust receipt transaction which the trustee was attempting to
avoid by an application of the New York Factor's Act, but the court
held that the trustee did not occupy the position of a bona fide purchaser as required by that Act, and as the Act did not protect creditors
of the bankrupt, the transfer was not a voidable preference.
The magnitude of business operations carried on by means of this
security device will more then likely assert itself in the application of
the Act by the courts. To insist on a complete renovation in the manner
of handling these transactions might well be more harmful than good,
and it is somewhat doubtful that the intention of Congress in passing
the Act was so extensive as to include such a result, notwithstanding the
fact that a strict interpretation of Section 60 (a) and (b) would probably operate to make them voidable prefetence.
What Constitutes an Antecedent Debt
Because the chief difficulty in the application of the amended Section 60 has been the determination of whether the transfer was made
for an antecedent debt or whether there was a present consideration
given for the transfer, it seems expedient that a separate portion of this
aritcle should be devoted to a discussion of the views taken thus far
by the courts. The cases which present the problem are those in which
recording is required and the creditor records the instrument within
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. It seems rather
well settled that where, e. g., a mortgage is executed within the four
40 New England Auto Investment Co. v. St. Germaine, 45 R. I. 225, 121 Atl.
398 (1923); Jones v. Commercial Trust, 64 Utah 151, 228 P. 896 (1924).
41 Blydenstein v. New York Security and Trust Co., 67 Fed. 469 (1895);
International Trust Co. v. Webster National Bank, 258 Mass. 17, 154 N. E. 330,
49 A. L. R. 267 (1926).
42 Section 9, sub 2, a (1).
43 In re Perlhefter, 177 Fed. 299 (1910) ; Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1933) on p. 246: "the majority
of the cases in which the validity of the unrecorded security interest was tested,
up to 1929, held the -financing agency's interest invalid as against a bona fide
purchaser from the dealer in the regular course of trade, but declared it valid
against the trustee in bankruptcy."
44 183 Fed. 733 (1910).
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months' period to secure a debt incurred previously, it is a transfer for
an antecedent debt.
In Adams v. City Bank and Trust Company,4 5 the bankrupt borrowed money from defendant on two dates, June 24, 1939, and September 15, 1939, at the same time executing to it bills of sale. 46 The defendant did not record thesebills of sale until December 18, 1939, when
it had reason to believe the bankrupt was insolvent. On December 30,
1939, the bankrupt was adjudicated so. The court in determining whether this was a preference, considered the requirement that the transfer
must be "for or on account of an antecedent." On this point, the court
said: "This refers to the whole transaction, and not simply to the step
to be taken to make it binding as to the subsequent creditors and purchasers for a valuable consideration. The language is more direct and
specific than that .of the original act and prior amendments, but does
not indicate a legislative intent to change the historic import of the
word, preference ....47 In the instant case, the bills of sale were given
for a present equivalent at the time the debts were incurred, and did
not become voidable in bankruptcy by reason of subsequent filing for
record."
The opposite conclusion was reached in the case of In re Quaker
Skeet Metal Co.,48 with one justice dissenting: This case concerned the
validity of secured claims by assignees of accounts receivable. These
assignees had not given notice to the debtor and under Pennsylvania
law, a subsequent bona fide purchaser could have acquired rights superior to those of the assignees. The assignments were collateral security for loans advanced to the bankrupt and made at the time of the
loans. In considering the requirement that a transfer must be for or on
account of an antecedent debt, the court said: "In other words, is a
debt to be treated as antecedent to a transfer actually made contemporaneously but not perfected as against purchasers and creditors of
the debtor until a later time? We think that a fair construction of the
statutory language requires an affirmative answer to this question."
In his dissent to the majority opinion, Justice Jones admits that the
majority opinion of the court has the support of learned authors, 49 but
he said: "And, so according to the prevailing argument, the entire trans45 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 453, cert. den. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 739,
noted (1941) 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 510 (1941), 41 Col. L. Rev. 512.
46 Bills of sale are generally held to be chattel mortgages. 1 Jones, Chattel
Mortgages and Conditional Sales (6th Ed., 1933).
47 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.) § 60.02.
48 129 F. (2d) 894 (1942).
49 See McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy
Act (1937), 4 Univ. of Chicago L. Rev. 369, 388; Mulder, Ambiguities in the
Chandler Act (1940), 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 10, 25; 3 Collier on Bankruptcy, (14th
Ed.) par. 60A8, p. 962 et seq. Contra, see 4 Remington on Bankruptcy, (4th Ed.)
§ 1717.
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action of contemporaneous loan and transfer is split apart and the unperfected transfer is 'deemed to have been made immediately before
bankruptcy,' as Sec. 60, sub. a, provides, while the loan for which the
transfer was contemporaneously made retains the original date of the
actual transaction and thus becomes antecedent in relation to the time
of the transfer, as statutorily presumed under the attending circumstances. To so hold seems to be a striking instance of lifting oneself by
one's bootstraps and terminates in a result which I do not think Sec.
60, sub. a, was intended to bring about." 50
Justice Jones has admirably made his point, but to so construe this
section of the bankruptcy law is to limit it so that the change it will
work is practically negligible. In the construction of statutes, courts
must look to legislative intent, if it is discernible, and bring about such
a result, and in the case of Section 60, that, is easily found. In the
House Committee Report 51 on the proposed changes in the Bankruptcy
Act, it reads: "The new test is more comprehensive and accords with
the contemplated purpose of striking down secret liens. .

. .

As thus

drafted, it included a failure to record any other grounds which could
be asserted by a bona fide purchaser or a creditor of the transferor,
as against the transferee."
In the instant case, and in the Adams v. City Bank case, 52 it would
have been possible for a bona fide purchaser of the bankrupt to intervene and cut off the rights of the creditor whose security transfer had
not been perfected. How it is possible to reach any other conclusion
than that the subsequent perfection of the transfers would not operate
as a voidable preference under the new provision is hard to realize. It
is inconceivable that Congress could have intended such a limitation,
and it is definitely out of step with the trend of the times towards open
and fair dealings in the field of finance and commerce.
Conclusion
If the courts give heed to the legislative intent in passing the
Chandler Act, sweeping changes will result in the method of handling
the normal security transaction. Congress has provided the machinery
by which the reforms may be manufactured and now it is in the hands
of the courts to operate this machinery. The Chandler Act aids the
vigilant and fair dealing financier, but denounces the lax and secret
holder of securities. If applied wisely, it should result in the handling
of security devices more open and equitably and prevent the construction of false credit structures which have been so frequent in the past.
Some hardships will undoubtedly result from the operation of the Act
50

129 F. (2d) 897 (1942).

51

Report No. 1409, 75th Congress, 1st Session, July 29, 1937.

(C. C. A. 5th, 1940), 115 F. (2d) 453, cert. den. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 739,
noted (1941) 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 510 (1941), 41 Col. L. Rev. 512.
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but the overall good which emanates from its principles should outweigh these hardships. If any of the states desire to perpetuate certain
methods now used, it is within their power to do so by legislative or
judicial action but it may be hoped that they will follow the lead of
Congress in bringing these barbarous methods of doing business into
the realm of civilization.
John R. Baty.

VALIDITY OF ORAL EXTENSION OF MORTGATE TO COVER ADDITIONAL

limited to a consideration of cases
wherein there is a determination of the effect of an oral agreement
purporting to extend an existing real estate mortgage or deed of trust
to cover an indebtedness not within the contemplation of the parties
at the time the security was given. Decisions relating to the right of
a lien holder to include items paid by way of protecting or enforcing
his security such as taxes, prior liens, insurance, attorney fees, etc.,
without an agreement with the mortgagor for including these items
in the mortgage indebtedness, are excluded, although reference will
be made to the equity rule of some jurisdictions requiring payment
of all debts on redemption, such doctrine is not covered except in instances where an extension agreement had been made. The reissue or "revival of a mortgage which has been released, or discharged by payment,
or full performance of other conditions is not within this problem. It
will be observed that the parol evidence rule which prohibits the inclusion of "altering" terms in a written instrument is not directly involved in this consideration, and is mentioned only in so far as it is
distinguished from the Statute of Frauds which prevents the oral transfer of interests in land. This work will include only agreements for the
oral extension made subsequently to the mortgage, and relating only
to indebtedness not within the contemplation or purview of the parties
at the time the instrument giving the lien was executed.
By way of an entre, or more seasonally a "spring-board" from which
to plunge into this subject of the oral extension of the mortgage indebtedness we will consider the recent Wisconsin case of Healy v. Fidelity
Savings Bank.1 Richard Healy brbught an action against the bank, the
administrator of the estate of Theresa Feichtner, and Clara Feichtner,
to recover $1500 as the balance due on a loan of $3000, and also $500
further owing on an additional loan, and for the foreclosure of a
mortgage on real estate to secure the original and subsequent amount.
It was admitted by the defendants that the sums of $1500 and $500
with interest were due on the loans, but they denied that the latter
amount was secured by the mortgage. The trial court found that the
INDEBTEDNESS.-This paper is

1

238 Wis. 12, 298 N. W. 170 (1941).
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$500 loan was intended by the parties to be secured by the mortgage
which was given originally to secure the loan of $3000, and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover the $2000 owing on both loans' and the
foreclosure of the mortgage as security for both loans. On appeal the
plaintiffs claimed that when the amount owing on the note had been
reduced to $1500 the makers of it obtained an additional loan of $500
under an oral agreement between the parties that the mortgage was to
stand as security for also the additional loan. The principal contention
of the appellants is that the mortgage originally given to secure the
$3000 note cannot be effectively extended five years later by a mere
oral agreement to secure the subsequent $500 loan. On the other hand
the plaintiffs contend that the mortgage to secure the debt which has
been reduced to $1500 can be so extended as to secure the subsequent
$500 loan where there are no equities of other parties intervening.
Appellants rely principally upon the provision in Section 240.-06,
Stats., in contending that the alleged oral agreement is invalid. This
provision states that: "No estate or interest in lands, other than leases
for a term not exceeding one year . . .shall be created, granted, as-

signed, surrendered or declared unless by act or operation of law or by
deed or conveyance in writing, subscribed by the party creating ...
the same

. .

." In view of this provision no rights in and to real prop-

erty, nor trust or powers over the same, can be granted by parol; and,
consequently, no additional mortgage lien or encumbrance on real property can be created by a subsequent parol agreement to secure other
indebtedness than that which was intended to be secured when the
mortgage was executed. As is stated in 19 Ruling Case Law: 2 "But a
mortgage cannot, subsequent to its execution be extended by parol
agreement to secure debts or obligations other than those which it was
executed to secure. Such an extension, if effective would be equivalent
to the execution of a new mortgage to secure the additional obligations.
It therefore falls within the prohibition of the Statute of Frauds. It is
quite true that oral testimony is admissible to show what obligations
were intended to be secured by a mortgage and will be received to establish that the mortgage was in fact given to secure obligations dis-"
tinct from those expressed. But this doctrine permits parol testimony
only to show the intention of the parties at the time the mortgage was
executed and not to establish a subsequent agreement, in effect creating
a new mortgage to extend the mortgage to secure additional obligations."
On the other hand the contention of the plaintiffs that the security
afforded by a mortgage may be extended by a parol agreement to cover
an additional loan where the rights of third persons are not prejudiced
is based largely upon decisions in suits in equity, which were brought
by the mortgagor to redeem, but in which the mortgagee was held en2

p. 306, §982.
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titled to show that he had made an additional loan to the mortgagor
in consideration of an oral agreement between them that the-mortgage
should stand as security for it also. Obviously it would be inequitable
under such circumstances to allow the mortgagor to redeem upon the
payment of but the amount originally secured by the mortgage, and so
he was considered as being in court with unclean hands in seeking such
relief. Therefore, it was considered proper to deny such relief to the
mortgagor unless, under the doctrine that he who seeks equity must do
equity, the security afforded by the mortgage was held to cover also the
additional loan.
The appellate court held that the lower court had erred in concluding that the additional loan of $500 was also secured by the mortgage,
and so modified the judgment so as to make only $1500 secured by the
mortgage.
Now that we have entered upon the consideration of this problem of
extension of the mortgage indebtedness let us examine the cases on this
subject. In Johnson v. Anderson 3 the court held that in an action by
the grantee of a mortgage to enjoin the sale of certain real estate under
a mortgage, that the mortgage could not be extended to cover future
liabilities on account between the parties by parol agreement subsequently to the execution of the mortgage. An issue as to the right of a
bank under a deed of trust to hold the proceeds of the security against
the claims of general creditors was presented in Williams v. Hill,4 on a
garnishment of such grantee followed by his answer, claiming that he
held a certain amount of the proceeds received on sale of the security
over and above the amount required to liquidate the original indebtedness specified in the deed of trust, under an 'oral agreement subsequently made, to the effect that any surplus of the proceeds of the sale
should be held as security for a distinct and additional indebtedness.
The court in holding that the plaintiff in the garnishment action had
been successful in reaching the fund, stated that the parol agreement
under which the grantee in the deed of trust claimed the proceeds of the
sale was avoided by the Statute of Frauds.
In Hughes v. Johnson r where the plaintiff sought to foreclose upon
an account additional to the original indebtedness secured, alleging that
the mortgagors had agreed that such mortgage should stand as security
for the additional indebtedness it was held: "No mortgage of lands can,
by parol agreement between the parties, be made to cover any other
debt or any larger amount of debt than that expressed. This is no longer an open question in this state." The principle governing the foregoing
Arkansas cases was re-enunciated by the Arkansas court in Briggs v.
3 30 Ark. 749 (1875).
4

19 How. (U. S.) 246, 15 L. ed 510 (1857).

5 30 Ark. 285 (1881).
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Steele.0 Although the court in the latter case makes the statement that:
"a parol agreement made subsequently to enlarge the indebtedness
which it is to secure will be inoperative," it appears that such determination of the particular point of law may not have been necessary
to a decision in the case, since the opinion rendered on rehearing of the
cause states that the additional accounts were run without further understanding as to security.
Statutory construction was involved in London & S. F. Bank v.
Bandmann.7 There, where appellant sought to show that the giving of a
promissory note to cover the indebtedness described in the mortgage
was a renewal or extension of the mortgage within the statute providing
that "a mortgage can be created, renewed, or extended only by writing
executed with the formalties required in the case of a grant of real
property," it was held that the term "extended" as used in such statutes
referred to a broadening of the security to cover additional indebtedness. In Tunno v. Robert 8 where it appeared that the mortgagor obligated hereself to reimburse the mortgagee for expenditures made in repairing and paying taxes upon the premises, and executed the mortgage
for the purpose of securing such obligations, it was held that the mortgagee could not take credit for taxes paid for a year not embraced in the
agreement. The opinion of the court without making reference to the
character of any agreement for the extension of the security as oral or
in writing said: "A mortgage cannot thus 'be extended to a debt not
embraced in its provisions where the mortgagee is seeking a foreclosure."
In the Georgia case of Pierce v. Parrish9 the original security transaction had been completed through the grantee advancing the money
to complete the purchase of the land in question under a contract of
sale, and taking the deed directly from the vendor, with the understanding that a conveyance would be made upon payment of the
amount advanced. As a matter of defense to an action for performance
of this agreement to convey, the grantee sought to show an extension of
the security to cover further advances of money for the purchase of
necessary supplies. The court, in refusing to give effect to any security
for indebtedness other than the original stated: "At the time of this
conversation an alleged agreement, as we have seen, Parrish had no
interest in the land save as the possessor of the naked paper title, and
if he had desired to secure the payment of his advances to Pierce he
should have had such contract of security reduced to writing and executed by Pierce. This is the only way in which such security could
have been created." Although there are statements in the syllabus in
Troup v. Speer 10 which might appear to support the view that, as be6
7
8
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tween the parties, the lien of a mortgage in the form of an absolute deed
might be extended by a subsequent parol agreement, it would seem
that the court had reference to agreements made contemporaneously
with the exedution of the deed.
The Indiana court in Irwin v. Hubbard11 held that under a statute
a parol agreement for a change in an existing mortgage to provide that
the same should stand as security for an obligation to a third party was
not enforceable. The court held that agreement to change the mortgage
to cover the additional liability was in effect an agreement to execute
a new mortgage.
In Crooks v. Jenkins 12 the court held that, where an absolute deed
was given by way of security, a subsequent mortgagee took subject to
the lien to the extent of the indebtedness secured, but that this indebtedness could not be increased by conversation between the parties after
the mortgage had been executed and recorded.
Looking to the Kansas court, we see that in Bell v. Coffin 13 where
the security was in fact a mortgage but in the form of an absolute deed,
the court held that an attempted extension of the security to cover both
the original indebtedness and the amount of certain overdrafts arising
subsequently to the original indebtedness failed because the parties did
not reduce their agreement to writing. The court referred to the Kansas
Statute of Frauds.
The mortgage was in the form of an absolute deed in Reed v. McGinty 14 and the trial court in computing the amount due had included an
indebtedness incurred after the execution of the mortgage. The court in
pointing out the error in this computation, used the following language:
"That was error, for since the deed was in reality a mortgage to secure
a particular indebtedness, the mortgage could not, by implication, be
extended so as to include other and subsequent indebtedness of the
plaintiff to the defendant. To permit such would be to eke out a mortgage by parol or by mere implication."
While admitting the existence of the equitable doctrine of tacking
subsequent indebtedness to the original amount of the mortgage when
redemption is sought through action by a mortgagor, the court refused
to extend the principle to the situation where the mortgagor is seeking
foreclosure in the case of Haykurst v. Morin.15 It should be"observed,
however, that the court found another objection to including the additional indebtedness in foreclosure in the fact that there did not appear
to be any consideration for the oral agreement on the part of the mort11
12
13
14
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gagor that the original mortgage should stand as security for the additional indebtedness.
Another case in line with the majority rule is Curle v. Eddy. 16 In
that case, where an absolute deed had been given by way of security,
it was held that an agreement purporting to extend the security to cover future advances was void as contrary to the Statute of Frauds. Again
in Bender v. Zimmerman 17 the mortgage was in the form of an absolute deed. The court, in an action by the mortgagor to compel a reconveyance, held that the Statute of Frauds invalidated an agreement
between the mortgagor and mortgagee made subsequently to the date
of the deed, that the latter should stand as security or as an indemnity
against loss on account of a breach of warranty in another deed between
the parties.
In Stoddard v. Hart 18 where at the time that the additional advance
was made an insertion was made in the bond, adding to the latter a
further condition for the payment of the additional advance, the court,
after holding that the insertion in the bond could not be construed as
actually incorporated in the mortgage, held that, for the court to go
ahead and effectuate what appeared to be an understanding between
the parties would be to give relief directly in contravention of the Statute of Frauds. In another New York case, Townsend v. Empire StoneDressing Co.,19 although the question of whether the mortgage was
security for the price of extra stonework supplied by the mortgagor
probably rests upon- the interpretation of agreements made contemporaneously with the mortgage, the court made statements which show its
attitude on parol agreements. One statement is as follows: "As to the
decisions in our own state respecting the extension of a mortgage, so as
to cover future advances, I understand it to be the law that they never
can exceed such sum stated in the mortgage, and I understand it not to
be the law of any case that, if such sum was unpaid the mortgage could,
by parol, be extended to an additional sum."
Another obiter statement by the New York court indicating its posi0
tion upon the question in hand appears in Walker v. Snediker.2 There
the court said: "It has been settled in equity, by repeated decisions,
that a mortgage to secure future as well as present responsibilities is
good. But the better opinion, if not the decided law, is that the mortgage must express the object. It is certain that it cannot be rendered
available for future liabilities by a subsequent parol agreement." Wherein the case of Harper v; Spainhour,21 a covenant was executed whereby
16
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the defendant agreed to convey certain premises to the plaintiff when
the latter had performed certain work for the former, the covenant being deposited with a third person for safe-keeping, and afterwards the
parties agreed by parol that the covenant should be held to indemnify
the defendant for becoming surety on an obligation of the plaintiff, it
was held that such parol agreements fell within the Statute of Frauds,
and was not enforceable.
The North Dakota statute providing that a mortgage of real property could not be extended except in writing was construed by the court
in Peoples' State Bank v. Francis22 as referring to the situation where
the mortgage is extended to cover additional indebtedness rather than
an extension of time of payment of the debt. The court said: "A mortgage is 'extended' only when it is made to stand as security for some
debt or obligation not originally included therein. This can only be done
as the statute directs."
In the case of 'Walker v. Walker 28 where the mortgage had been
given in the form of an absolute deed, and the mortgagor was seeking,
as the defendant, in an action to recover possession of the land, to set
up her rights as equitable owner, it was held that the parties might by
parol extend the security to cover new indebtedness. Later in O'Neill
v. Bennett,24 which was an action of foreclosure on a formal mortgage
with bond, it was distinctly held that the security could not be extended
by oral agreement to cover subsequent advances by the mortgagee to
the mortgagor. Though there are statements in the Walker Case 25
which, if given their full import in the O'Neill Case,26 might have resulted in a different decision from that reached, the Walker decision is
explained on the ground that the mortgagor therein was in effect a redemptioner seeking equitable relief, and for that reason was required
to pay all indebtedness to the mortgagee. This construction of the
Walker Case 27 was accepted in Levi v. Blackwell.28 There the court
said that, where the grantor of a deed was endeavoring to show that the
same was not intended to operate as an absolute conveyance, but that
by way of security only, the matter involved was not one of contract
but of pure equity, and that such grantor, in seeking protection of the
court against the holder of the legal title, must come into courts prepared to do equity, and pay not only the original indebtedness, but
whatever else he might owe the holder of the legal title.
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In Zastrow v. Knight 29 which involved an extension of time of payment, the court held that the statute providing, "A mortgage of real
property can be created, renewed, or extended only by writing, executed
with the formalities required in the case of a grant of real property,"
had no relation to the extension of time of payment, but, on the other
hand, referred to extending the mortgage in the sense of bringing additional indebtedness within the protection of the same.
In Virginia it was held in Colqukoun v. Atkinson 3 0 that a bond and
negotiable note could not be-included in the indebtedness secured by a
previous deed of trust, in the absence of a written agreement to that
effect.
According to the more recent case of Hendrickson v. Farmers' Bank
& Trust Co.31 where a mortgage is given to secure a specific debt
named, the security will not be extended as to antecedent debts unless
the instrument so provides and identifies those intended to be secured
in clear terms, and to be extended as to antecedent debts, these must
be of the same class and so related to the primary debt secured that the
assent of the mortgagor will be inferred. The reasoa is that mortgages,
by the use of general terms, ought never to be so extended as to secure
debts which the debtor did not contemplate. "Where one contracts in
good faith with a debtor that the security given should include not only
that specifically mentioned in the mortgage but other indebtedness,
whether existing then or to be incurred in the future, it is not difficult
to describe the nature and character thereof so that both the debtor and
third parties may be fully advised as to the extent of the mortgage."
In Bank of Searcy v. Kroh 32 it was held that deeds of trust given
as security for a specific debt and extensions or renewals thereof, and as
security for the payment of any other liabilities of the grantor already
or thereafter contracted, could not be extended to secure an antecedent
indebtedness which had been discharged in bankruptcy.
We come now to a consideration of the cases in which the court permitted an oral agreement for the extension of the security mortgaged to
cover additional and subsequent indebtedness and notice that the
ground for so doing was for the most part based on the equitable principle of requiring one seeking equity to do equity.
In Mattamuskeet Drainage Dist. v. Wills

3

which was a bill in

equity for a mandatory injunction to compel the defendant contractors
to proceed with certain dredging work, the latter defended upon the
ground that the services which said defendants were asked to perform
29
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constituted extra work payment which was not secured under the
deed of trust originally executed for the security of the defendants.
No mention was made of the Statute of Frauds in the opinion. The
court, however, in holding that the defendants were secured for the extra the same as for the work enumerated in the original agreement for
security, whereby the extra work was brought within the protection of
the security. A fair statement of this decision, however, demands an
inclusion of the statement that the only doubt cast upon the validity
arrangement for further security was that raised by the defendant contractors themselves.
The Alabama decision in Edwards v. Dwight,34 the court after alluding to the fact that a ruling on the efficacy of the parol agreement
was not necessary to the decision in the case, took the liberty to make
the following exposition of principle: "There are, however, two cogent
reasons, founded in public policy which would cause us to hesitate long
before declaring that, when a mortgage security is executed to secure
a debt of defined amount or special description, parol testimony can be
let in to enlarge the amount, or to tack to the mortgage another and
different debt, whether sought to be done under an alleged contemporaneous or subsequent agreement. The reasons are: (1) It is of doubtful and dangerous policy to allow parties to add in this way to a stipulation to a solemn written contract; (2) such practice would unduly expose the mortgagor to the power and oppression of the mortgagee."
The later case of Hanchey v. Powell 35 marks the point where the court
was called upon to decide whether a debt of the mortgagor for insurance effected by the mortgagee was embraced in the mortgage by virtue
of an oral agreement. It was there held that the mortgage cannot be
changed or extended by parol, so as to cover debts not covered by the
same. In the case of McWhorter v. Tyson,3 6 however, which was an
action by the mortgagor for. equitable relief of cancellation, and an
injunction to restrain foreclosure, where it appeared that, besides the
original mortgage indebtedness, there was a subsequent indebtedness
incurred under an arrangement between the parties whereby the original
mortgage should stand as security for the new loan, the court held that
it would be inequitable to give the mortgagor the relief which he requested without requiring him to restore that which he had obtained
upon the strength of the oral agreement.
In Mead's Appeal,3 7 a Connecticut case, the personal representative
of the insolvent mortgagor's estate stood in his shoes, and the court held
that, where an absolute deed had been given to the creditor for security,
and subsequently through agreements negotiated with the assent of the
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mortgagor, the land embraced in the deed had been conveyed to another creditor, with the understanding that the security should stand
for the original indebtedness taken up by the grantee in the second
conveyance and also for the amount -which the original grantor owed
the second grantee, the land was charged with the payment of both the
original indebtedness and the sums that were later agreed to be paid
and secured upon said land.
Where a sale of property covered by a mortgage had been made as
in Burke Land & Livestock Co. v. Wells, F. & Co., 38 it was alleged that
the purchaser had agreed that the mortgage should stand as security
for the entire purchase price, which amount represented various items
of indebtedness of the vendor company and its organizer to the mortgagee. In answer to the contention made by the purchaser that the enforcement of such an oral agreement would be in conflict with the statite, which required renewal or extension to be in writing, the court
said: "That section of our Revised Statutes was enacted to prevent
fraud, and not for the purpose of enabling one to procure the property
of another through fraud. Its provisions are not applicable to this case.
The purchaser is not the mortgagor or mortgagee. It is a stranger to
such mortgage, and as it agreed that they should stand and -remain as
security for the payment of the purchase price of said property, it is
estopped from denying that they are security therefor, and at the same
time. claiming the property under the contract."
Although in Brown v. Gaffney 30 the court held that a mortgagee
was entitled to hold his lien for security as to subsequent advances
made by him without a written agreement to that effect, the decision
as interpreted in the later case of Carpenter v. Plagge,4 0 seems to have
been reached under the equitable doctrine of tacking rather than under
a rule of law gibing effect to an oral agreement for the extension of
security to additional indebtedness. In this latter case, where the action
was one by the mortgagor to redeem the premises, the court held that
the mortgagor, in order to be entitled to redemption, should pay not
only the amount of the mortgage, but also further advances which the
mortgagee had made to the mortgagor on the oral agreement of the latter that the mortgage should stand as security therefor.
In Stone v. Lane 41 it was held that, where the mortgagor or his
representative is seeking to redeem the premises, equity will require the
payment of a debt which the mortgagor orally agreed shbuld be secured
by a mortgage previously executed.
Although the action in Tierney v. Citizens Say. Bank,42 was not
brought to redeem mortgaged premises, the complaint as an encum7 Idaho 42, 60 P. 87 (1900).
39 28 IM. 149 (1862).
38
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brancer demanding an assignment of the mortgage to her nominee, the
court, in holding that an oral agreement between mortgagor and mortgagee would be effectual to raise the rate of interest on the secured obligation, cited other cases as authority for the proposition that the higher rate should stand against the complainant seeking to enforce an assignment.
An oral agreement between the mortgagor and the mortgagee that
the mortgage should stand as security for an additional indebtedness
was considered by the court in Flanagan v. Westcott,48 as sufficient between the parties. Where a mortgage was originally given by a partnership to cover indebtedness of the mortgagor to the partnership, both
present and prospective, and on dissolution of said partnership the
mortgage was assigned to one of the partners with the understanding
between the partners and the mortgagor that the mortgage should stand
as security both for the indebtedness already contracted and the indebtedness to be subsequently contracted with the assignee individually,
it was held that the mortgage was good security for the indebtedness
to the assignee individually. Nothing more than an oral understanding
between the parties seems to have been involved in the case of Kapalczynski v. Sitniski,44 where the court said: "It seems to be settled in
this state that a mortgage which has been either partly or wholly satisfied may be made security by the mortgagor for a further or other debt
than that for which it was originally given,... and therefore the complainants contention of a new loan on the security of the mortgage, if
true in point of fact, would be well founded in law."
No reference was made to the necessity for a written agreement to
extend the security in Pettis v. Darling.4 5 There the additional indebtedness consisted of a note which -was given when the interest rate was
raised by agreement between the parties, such note representing the
difference between the interest under the old agreement and the interest
after the same was raised.
In a trespass to try title suit brought by the holder of a first trust
deed, which had taken a renewal trust deed to secure the balance due on
the original indebtedness, together with subsequently incurred indebtedness, the evidence was held to establish that the parties intended to
make a renewal and extension of the original lien, rather than to extinguish it. It is manifest from a careful examination of the record that
it was the intention of Landrum and the appellee to make a renewal
J. Eq. 264 (1856).
3. Eq. 524, 111 A.
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and extension of the balance due on the Wood $600 note and its lien,
in the note and deed of trust of March 3, 1928, and that there was no
intention to extinguish either such debt or lien. A recital in such deed
of trust that the $2800 note was given in renewal of the balance due on
such $600 note, as well as other indebtedness, and that the lien existing
at that time to secure its payment was continued, would have furnished better evidence of such intention, but the absence of such recital will not necessarily affect appellee's rights, as appellant is a subsequent encumbrancer thereto with notice.
Now that we have reviewed the holdings and opinions of the courts
on this subject of extension of the mortgage security to cover additional
indebtedness by parol we look to secondary authorities and authors for
a brief summary of the general views on the matter in hand.
Section sixty-eight of AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE states: "A mortgage doesn't secure obligations which were not contemplated by the
parties to be secured thereby. Indeed, it is a general rule that a mortgage
cannot, subsequent to its execution be extended by parol agreement to
secure debts or obligations other than those which it was executed to
secure. Such an extension if effective, would be equivalent to the execution of a new mortgage to secure the additional obligations. It therefore
falls within the prohibition of the Statute of Frauds. It is true that the
oral testimony is admissible to show what obligations were intended to
be scured by a mortgage and will be received to establish that the
mortgage was in fact given to secure obligations distinct from those
expressed, but this doctrine permits parol testimony only to show the
intention of the parties at the time the mortgage was executed and not
to establish a subsequent agreement, in effect creating a new mortgage,
to extend the mortgage to secure additional obligations."
Then in

JONES ON

MORTGAGES (Eighth Edition) and section four-

hunderd and thirty-nine we find: "By parol agreement, a mortgage cannot be so altered in its operation as to stand as security for a new debt,
different in character and amount from that mentioned in the instrument, payable at a different time and to another person especially where
the conduct of the parties at the time of the transaction evidenced no
such understanding. An agreement that a promissory not shall be substituted for notes of a larger amount already secured by a mortgage,
and if paid at maturity shall be considered a payment and discharge
pro tanto of those notes of the mortgage, and that the mortgage shall be
held as collateral security for the new note, and not be discharged or
cancelled until that is paid, does not create a lien upon the mortgaged
property to secure its payment. The note is not given in renewal or con-

